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Case No. 20150460-SC 
IN THE 
UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plain tiff! Appellee, 
V. 
LISSETTE MARIAN DEJESUS, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from her conditional guilty plea to one count of 
~ assault by a prisoner, a third degree felony, Utah Code Ann. §76-5-102.5 (West 
2015). This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. §78A-3-102(3)(b) 
(West 2009) ( cases certified by court of appeals). 
INTRODUCTION 
Defendant intentionally kicked a corrections officer who had broken up a 
fight between Defendant and another inmate. Relying on State v. Tiedemann, 
Defendant moved to dismiss her charge of assault by a prisoner because the 
prison lost the surveillance footage of her assault. Defendant claimed that the 
footage would have shown that she was merely defending herself from the 
other inmate when she kicked the officer. But the only evidence supporting 
Defendant's version was the testimony of another inmate that the trial court 
found to be incredible. That inmate was Defendant's fiance and the trial court 
observed that Defendant had repeatedly signaled her with facial gestures as she 
testified. The trial court denied Defendant's motion because Defendant did not 
show a reasonable probability that the lost footage would have been 
exculpatory. Alternatively, the court found that even if Defendant had made 
such a showing, dismissal was inappropriate because the footage was only 
negligently lost and Defendant had not proven prejudice. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
la. Did the trial court correctly interpret State v. Tiedemann to require that 
a defendant who moves to dismiss based on the loss of evidence must first 
show a reasonable probability that the lost evidence would have been 
exculpatory? 
1 b. Alternatively, did the trial court correctly deny Defendant's motion 
to dismiss after balancing the Tiedemann factors? 
Standard of Review. "Whether the State's destruction of potentially 
exculpatory evidence violates due process is a question of law" reviewed "for 
correctness." State v. Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, if12, 162 P.3d 1106. This Court 
reviews the trial court's factual findings for clear error. Id. 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Utah Constitution art. I,§ 7 states: 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without 
due process of law. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE1 
Defendant assaults another inmate and a prison guard 
Corrections Officer Hansen was escorting inmates Samantha Dash and 
Fatima Kahn back to their cells at the Utah State Prison's women's facility. RSS-
57. Defendant, Lisette Dejesus, shared cell 416 with Inmate Dash. R57,66.2 
Their cell was on the building's top tier to the right of the stairs as one faces the 
cells. R66-67. Kahn's cell-415 - was adjacent to the right of Defendant's cell. 
R62,66-67,70. To the left of Defendant's cell were cells 417 and 418 and then the 
showers. R66. 
Officer Hansen was following inmates Dash and Kahn up the stairs. R57-
58. He instructed Inmate Kahn to stand in front of her cell door, but Kahn 
~ stopped in front of Defendant and Dash' s cell and began arguing with 
Defendant. R58. At one point, Defendant exclaimed, "are we really gonna do 
this in front of the cops[?]" R59. Meanwhile, Officer Hansen's partner opened 
1 Because Defendant pled guilty, most of the factual statement comes 
from the preliminary hearing transcript, a copy of which is in Addendum B. 
2 Officer Hansen originally said that Defendant and Dash were in cell 
415, R57, but clarified that they were actually in cell 416, R66,76. 
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both cell doors before Hansen was ready and Inmate Dash distracted Officer 
Hansen by exclaiming "Hansen[,] check this out." R58,76,67. Dash then pulled 
open Defendant's cell door and Defendant emerged and attacked Kahn. R59,76. 
Hansen pulled Defendant off of Kahn and carried Defendant back into 
her cell. R59. But before he could pull the door closed, Defendant pushed past 
him. R60,70. Hansen quickly pushed Defendant to the floor and off to the left 
towards the showers. R60,70.3 
As Hansen again approached Defendant to subdue her, she looked him 
"directly" in his eyes and kicked him twice, once in the lower abdomen, and 
again in his right thigh. R60,71. At this point, Kahn was "a few feet" behind 
Hansen. R60. She was not "anywhere near" him when Defendant kicked him. 
R61. 
About 15 to 30 minutes after the assault, Officer Hansen reviewed the 
surveillance footage. R73;R175:2. He confirmed that it recorded the assault and 
showed Kahn four to six feet behind him and "backing off" when Defendant 
kicked him twice. R175:2-3. 
3 Hansen testified on direct that when Defendant left her cell the second 
time, she and Kahn "engaged again fighting" before he pushed Defendant to 
the ground. R60. But he clarified on cross that Defendant did not reach Kahn 
before he pushed her down. R70. 
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The charge 
The State charged Defendant with one count of assault by a prisoner, 
Utah Code Ann. §76-5-102.5 (West 2015), a third degree felony. Rl-2. The State 
filed the information on 14 January 2014, a little over three and a-half months 
after the assault. Rl-2. Defense counsel entered his appearance and filed a 
~ general discovery request 13 days later, on 27 January 2014. R6-12. The 
discovery request sought all video recordings prepared during the investigation 
or prosecution of the case. R9. Two days later, on 29 January 2014, defense 
counsel filed a supplemental discovery request seeking a "copy of any video of 
the alleged incident." R18. Three months later, on 1 May 2014, the State 
responded that it was "unable to provide any video of the incident as none exist 
[sic] as per the Utah State Prison." R25. 
Defendant moves to dismiss 
Defendant moved to dismiss the charge under State v. Tiedemann, arguing 
~ that the prison's loss of the surveillance footage violated her due process rights 
under the state constitution. R37-44. She claimed that if she kicked Hansen, she 
did so unintentionally while defending herself from Kahn. R38. The trial court 
held an evidentiary hearing on the motion to allow the parties to introduce 
evidence on the Tiedemann factors: whether the lost footage was reasonably 
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likely to be exculpatory and if so, why it was lost, and the prejudice to 
Defendant, if any.4 R172;R175. 
At that hearing, Officer Hansen explained that footage from the prison's 
surveillance cameras is stored on a hard drive with a 30-day capacity. R175:7-
8;R172:4-5,8. After 30 days, the oldest footage is automatically overwritten with 
new footage. R175:7-8. Footage on the hard drive can be permanently saved by 
copying it to a DVD. R175:8. Hansen was not authorized to save surveillance 
footage; he understood that only his captain or the prison's investigations 
division could do that. R72;R175:10. Hansen understood that if the 
investigations division wanted a copy of surveillance footage, they had to ask 
an employee in the prison's information technology division to save it. R175:10. 
The prison investigator requests a copy of the 
surveillance footage but it is negligently lost 
The assault occurred on 27 September 2013. R56. Hansen quickly 
reported the assault to his supervisor and filed a written report. R175:8. His 
supervisor referred the matter to the prison's investigation division, and an 
investigator interviewed Hansen "about an hour and a half after the incident." 
R175:9. 
4 The evidentiary hearing began on 2 December 2014; the trial court 
heard additional evidence on 15 January 2015. Rll9,124;R175;Rl72. Copies of 
these transcripts are in Addenda C and D respectively. 
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Debbie Kemp, from the prison's investigations division, was the on-call 
investigator that day. R76;R172:1-2. Her first act was to ask if there was 
surveillance footage of the assault. R172:3. She was informed that there was, 
and that someone in the control room had viewed it. R172:3,5. Kemp then 
interviewed those involved and later returned to the control room to view the 
footage, but the officer there was new and could not replay it. R172:3, 5. Kemp 
asked that a copy of the footage be made because she was not authorized to 
make one herself; only a captain or lieutenant captain could do that. R172:3,6-7. 
Kemp could not recall the name of the officer that she asked to copy the footage; 
her office was not in the prison and she was not familiar with every officer who 
works there. R172:6,8. Kemp testified that the prison does not have a policy 
regarding "playbacks of recordings made in the prison through the camera 
system." R172:2. 
When the assault occurred, the investigations division had an unusually 
heavy workload because it was under extreme pressure to conduct background 
investigations on applicants for corrections officer positions. R172:3-4. Under 
normal conditions, an investigator would be assigned four or five background 
investigations at a time and have eight weeks to complete each investigation. 
R172:4. This load more than doubled in September 2014, with each investigator 
being assigned to complete ten background investigations at a time within three 
-7-
weeks. R172:4. This unusually heavy load continued for "three or four @ 
months" as the investigators worked to get caught up with all of the applicants. 
R172:4. 
That workload required prison investigators to put "[m]any things ... on 
the back burner." R172:4. It hampered Investigator Kemp's follow-up 
investigation and contributed to the delay in sending this case to the 
prosecutor's office. R172:4. 
Investigator Kemp could not recall when she followed up on the assault 
investigation, but estimated that it may have been well beyond 30 days later 
because her division was "still doing the background investigations." R172:7. 
When Kemp asked for the copy of the surveillance footage, prison officers could 
not produce one and they were uncertain whether one had even been made, or 
whether it had been made and misplaced. R172:6,8. 
Defendant provides no credible testimony 
about what the footage would have shown 
Defendant called Inmate Dash to testify about her recollection of the 
events. R175:13. Dash asserted her Fifth Amendment privilege and refused to 
testify. R175:15. As Dash asserted the privilege and then left the stand, the trial 
court observed that "Defendant pulled faces and made facial expressions as if to 
question what Dash had just done in open court." R131-32. The court was 
11 uncertain," however, about the II meaning of the interchange." R132. 
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Defendant also called inmate Sarah Ataata at the evidentiary hearing. 
R175:15. Ataata testified that she was in cell 417, which gave her a side view of 
the altercation. R175:19-20,23. She testified that she saw Defendant, Hansen, 
and Kahn all on the ground at the same time, that Kahn was behind Hansen 
and swinging over him to get to Defendant, and that Kahn never backed off. 
~ R175:17-19. Ataata never testified that Defendant did not kick Hansen or attack 
Kahn. R175:15-27. 
Ataata is Defendant's fiance. R175:26. During her testimony, the trial 
court observed that Defendant made "facial gestures and expressions of 
varying sorts to Ata[a]ta depending on what Ata[a]ta was saying in her 
testimony." R132. The trial court rejected Ataata' s testimony as incredible for 
three reasons: (1) her close relationship with Defendant; (2) Defendant's signals 
to Ataata during her testimony; and (3) the fact that Ataata viewed the events 
from an angle. R132,134. 
Defendant did not testify. R172;R175. 
Officer Hansen clarifies that the footage showed Kahn four 
to six feet behind him when Defendant assaulted him 
Officer Hansen initially described the assault in his testimony at 
Defendant's preliminary hearing. RSS-73. At that hearing, defense counsel 
i..iP asked on cross about Kahn's location when Hansen pushed Defendant down 
and to the left as she reemerged from her cell. R70. When defense counsel 
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asked whether Kahn "was immediately to your right?" Hansen responded, 
"Kahn ... she was on my back, I don't know exactly where she was. She was ... 
she was not . . . she was no longer on my shoulder though, I could not see her 
behind me, she was behind me." R70. When counsel asked "So she could've 
been as close as inches away but you couldn't see her?" Hansen responded, 
"But I could not see her, no." R70. 
At the evidentiary hearing on Defendant's motion to dismiss, defense 
counsel sought to clarify Hansen's preliminary hearing testimony. R175:4. 
Counsel reminded Hansen that he had earlier testified that Kahn was on his 
back but that he did not know where she was. R175:4-5. 
Hansen explained that he understood counsel's question at the 
preliminary hearing to have asked about his knowledge of Kahn's location 
while the altercation was ongoing, not based on what he saw in the surveillance 
footage. R130;R175:5. Hansen clarified that although he did not know Kahn's 
exact location behind him while the altercation was occurring, the surveillance 
footage showed that she was four to six feet behind him when Defendant 
kicked him. R130;R175:5-7. The trial court credited Hansen's explanation, 
finding: "Hansen said when he told counsel on cross examination that he did 
not know where Kalu1 was, that was based on what he knew at that time it was 
transpiring, but viewing the recording made him aware Kahn was four to six 
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feet behind him and was not engaging defendant when defendant kicked 
Hansen." R130. The trial court also found that Hansen had "presented credible 
evidence." R138. 
The trial court denies Defendant's motion to dismiss 
The trial court denied Defendant's motion to dismiss because it 
@ concluded that she had not satisfied the standard announced in State v. 
Tiedemann. R132-136 (Addendum A is a copy of the trial court's ruling). The 
trial court began by explaining that standard: a defendant must first 
demonstrate a '"reasonable probability' that lost or destroyed evidence would 
be exculpatory." R133. If a defendant makes that showing, then the trial court 
must balance two factors: (1) "the reason for the destruction or loss or failure of 
preservation of the evidence, including the degree of negligence or culpability 
on the part of the State," and (2) "the de[g]ree of prejudice to the defendant in 
light of the materiality and importance of the missing evidence in the context of 
@ the case as a whole, including the strength of the remaining evidence." R133. 
The court noted that the "main principle is fundamental fairness." R133. 
Applying this standard, the trial court found that Defendant had not 
shown a reasonable probability that the lost surveillance footage would have 
been exculpatory. R133-35. The court concluded that to "be reasonable ... 
evidence must be believable." R134. But the only evidence that Defendant had 
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produced to show that the footage would have been exculpatory was Ataata' s @ 
testimony. R133. Because Ataata's "testimony was not believable," the trial 
court concluded that it could not establish a reasonable probability that the 
surveillance footage would have been exculpatory. R133-35. 
The court recognized that Defendant's failure to satisfy Tiedemann's 
threshold requirement provided sufficient reason to deny the motion. R135. It 
nevertheless balanced the two Tiedemann factors. R135-38. Regarding the first 
factor - the reason for the loss of the evidence and the degree of the State's 
negligence or culpability-the court found that "the reasons given for the lack 
of preservation are believable, and amount to negligence but not in a high 
degree." R137. The court found "no culpable conduct by anyone in the 
Department of Corrections." R137. It supported these findings with subsidiary 
findings that: 
• Officer Hansen could not "cause the recording to be 
preserved"; 
• "The investigator ... asked the proper personnel to 'make [her] 
a copy' of the event"; 
• the footage "was not intentionally eliminated, or recorded 
over," although "it clearly should have been retained"; 
• "The nameless person who was asked to make a recording 
perhaps, for any number of reasons, evidently failed to do so"; 
• "The investigator, in the press of other business, failed to 
follow up in a timely way"; 
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• the failure to preserve a copy of the footage was "negligence, 
but negligence born of a multitude of factors and the fact that 
many personnel are involved in a setting such as a prison 
control unit"; 
• "The investigator should have ... conducted her investigation 
in a way that retains relevant evidence"; 
• the footage "was clearly relevant"; 
• but the failure to preserve a copy of the footage "was at most 
negligence, and not gross negligence and certainly not 
intentional." 
R137-38. Accordingly, the court concluded that "the reasons for the loss of the 
evidence favor the State rather than dismissal of the charges." R138. The court 
nevertheless expressed some frustration at the loss of the footage and 
recognized that "[m]ore responsible conduct" by the prison would have 
eliminated the need for this motion and the "attempt to 'divine' what the 
recording showed." R136-37. 
As for the second Tiedemann factor - prejudice to Defendant in light of the 
materiality and importance of the missing evidence - the court found that 
Defendant had not shown that she would suffer any prejudice from the loss of 
the footage. R136. She had failed to do so because she did not produce any 
credible evidence that the footage would show "in essence what defendant 
claims." R136. Rather, Officer Hansen's testimony was the only credible 
evidence recounting what occurred during the altercation. R138. Because no 
credible evidence supported a finding that the footage would have been 
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exculpatory, the court concluded that Defendant had failed to show any 
prejudice. R136. The trial court therefore denied Defendant's motion. R132-38 
(Add. A). 
Defendant's petition for interlocutory appeal is denied 
Defendant petitioned the court of appeals to review the trial court's 
interlocutory order. R143. That court denied the petition. R144. 
Defendant enters a conditional guilty plea 
Defendant then entered a conditional guilty plea to one count of assault 
by a prisoner, a third degree felony, reserving her right to appeal the denial of 
her motion. RlS0-58. In exchange, the prosecutor agreed to recommend that 
Defendant's sentence run concurrently with her other sentences. R153. In 
addition to the original charge that resulted in her incarceration, Defendant was 
serving other consecutive sentences based on her conduct while incarcerated. 
R173:7. 
Defendant receives a concurrent prison sentence 
The trial court sentenced Defendant to serve zero to five years in prison, 
to run concurrently with her other sentences. R157-58. Defendant timely 
appealed and the court of appeals certified the case to this Court.5 R159. 
5 State v. Mohamud, 20140844-SC, which the court of appeals also certified 
to this Court, also involves the denial of a motion to dismiss under State v. 
Tiedemann. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant argues that the trial court erroneously denied her motion to 
dismiss based on the lost surveillance footage because it misinterpreted State v. 
~ Tiedemann. She first argues that the trial court erroneoµ$ly interpreted 
Tiedemann to require her to make a threshold showing of a reasonable 
~ probability that the lost footage would have been exculpatory. She asserts that 
regardless of the nature of the footage, the trial court was required to balance 
the four factors that apply to an alleged discovery violation under rule 16, Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure, to resolve her motion. She contends that analysis 
of these factors requires dismissal. Alternatively, she argues that she was 
entitled to dismissal under the trial court's reading of Tiedemann because she 
demonstrated a reasonable probability that the lost footage would have been 
exculpatory, and also showed that the reasons for the loss and the resulting 
prejudice to her required dismissal. 
The trial court correctly interpreted and applied Tiedemann. The trial 
court's conclusion that Tiedemann requires a threshold showing is consistent 
with Tiedemann's language and structure, especially where the Vermont test that 
Tiedemann used as a model imposed the same threshold requirement. This 
requirement ensures that the due process analysis remains true to its 
touchstone - fundamental fairness. The loss of evidence can result in a 
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fundamental unfairness only when there is a reasonable probability that the 
evidence would have been exculpatory. Requiring a trial court to engage in a 
balancing test when the lost evidence would have been inculpatory or 
irrelevant would be pointless. Other states require a similar threshold showing. 
The trial court's interpretation was also consistent with both the court of 
appeals' interpretation of Tiedemann and defense counsel's reading of Tiedemann 
in his initial memorandum supporting the motion to dismiss. 
Although the Tiedemann court mentioned the rule 16 factors, it did not co-
opt them as the test for lost evidence claims. Those factors were designed to 
analyze a different problem: what to do when the prosecution does not disclose 
existing inculpatory evidence that it intends to introduce at trial. The Tiedemann 
court recognized that while the multi-factored balancing approach for 
analyzing rule 16 claims is helpful in analyzing lost evidence claims, the specific 
factors themselves are not. Instead, the Tiedemann court took the basic 
principles found in rule 16's approach and incorporated them into the two 
factors that a trial court must balance if a defendant can first show a reasonable 
probability that the lost evidence would have been exculpatory: (1) the reason 
the evidence was lost, including the degree of the State's culpability or 
negligence; and (2) the resulting prejudice to the defendant in light of the 
importance of the evidence. 
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The trial court correctly found that Defendant did not satisfy Tiedemann's 
threshold requirement or its balancing test. Defendant produced no credible 
evidence that the lost footage would have supported her version of the events. 
She therefore failed to show a reasonable probability that the lost footage would 
have been exculpatory. 
Although the trial court recognized that this was reason enough to deny 
the motion, it nevertheless considered Tiedemann' s two factors and correctly 
found that neither weighed in favor of dismissal. Prison officials were, at worst, 
only negligent in failing to preserve the footage. The prison investigator asked 
for a copy of the footage, but never received it and did not timely follow up due 
to the press of other business. Defendant also failed to show that she suffered 
any prejudice because all of the credible evidence showed that the video would 
have conclusively proven her guilt. Thus, the only party prejudiced by the loss 
of the footage was the State. 
If the trial court was required to analyze the rule 16 factors, this Court 
should remand for the trial court to do so, rather than analyzing those factors in 
the first instance. Alternatively, none of those factors weigh in favor of 
dismissal. First, the prosecutor did not misrepresent the existing evidence. 
Second, Defendant's claim that she was prejudiced by the loss of the footage is 
based on the unsupported presumption that it would have supported her 
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version of the events. All of the credible evidence demonstrated otherwise. 
Third, the trial court correctly found that the State was merely negligent in 
losing the footage. Finally, while it is undisputed that Defendant's own 
investigation could not have preserved the lost footage, that factor is unhelpful 
to a lost evidence analysis because it will always be satisfied when the State 
loses evidence. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY INTERPRETED AND 
APPLIED STATE V. TIEDEMANN 
In State v. Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, 162 P.3d 1106, this Court established the 
test for determining when the State's loss or destruction of evidence in a 
criminal prosecution violates a defendant's due process rights under the Utah 
Constitution. As explained below, the trial court here correctly interpreted 
Tiedemann to require a defendant to first establish "a reasonable probability that 
lost or destroyed evidence would be exculpatory." Id. ,I44. If a defendant does 
so, a trial court must then balance two factors: (1) the State's culpability in 
losing the evidence; and (2) the degree of prejudice to the defendant. Id. 
Defendant argues that the trial court erroneously interpreted Tiedemann 
to require a threshold showing. Br.Aplt. 15-16. Instead, Defendant argues that 
Tiedemann requires a trial court to balance the four factors that this Court has 
identified for analyzing an alleged discovery violation under rule 16, Utah 
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Rules of Criminal Procedure, "regardless of whether a defendant can 
demonstrate a reasonable probability that the destroyed evidence would be 
exculpatory." Br.Aplt. 16-17. Defendant argues that she is entitled to dismissal 
under a balancing of these factors. Br .A pit. 23-32. Alternatively, she argues 
that she was entitled to dismissal under the trial court's interpretation of 
'@ Tiedemann. Br.Aplt. 32-49. She asserts that she demonstrated a reasonable 
probability that the lost footage would have been exculpatory, and that the 
reasons for the footage's loss, and the resulting prejudice to her, required 
dismissal. Br.Aplt. 32-49. 
A. Tiedemann requires a threshold showing that the lost evidence 
was reasonably likely to be exculpatory. 
In Tiedemann, this Court considered whether the State's destruction of 
evidence from a murder investigation violated the defendant's rights under 
Utah's Due Process Clause. 2007 UT 49, ifif30-31, 39, 44. Tiedemann was 
charged with murdering three people in 1991. Id.if2. The State dismissed the 
charges after he was committed to the Utah State Hospital because he was 
incompetent and unlikely to ever be restored to competency. Id. if 7. Two years 
later, following standard policy, the state evidence custodian destroyed some of 
the physical evidence from the case. Id. if 8. 
Over eight years after the evidence was destroyed, the prosecutor refiled 
the murder charges after learning that Tiedemann was about to be released 
-19-
from the Utah State Hospital. Id. ifl0. Tiedemann moved to dismiss the refiled 
charges, arguing that the State's destruction of evidence violated his rights 
under Utah's Due Process Clause. Id. ,r,r10, 31, 33. The trial court denied the 
motion. Id. if 10. 
1. The Tiedemann test. 
In resolving Tiedemann' s interlocutory appeal, this Court considered 
whether to adopt under the Utah Constitution, the United States Supreme 
Court's analysis for determining whether the prosecution's loss or destruction @ 
of evidence violates the Federal Due Process Clause. Id. if if 39, 44. The Supreme 
Court held in Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988), that when the most 
that could be said about the lost evidence is that it was "potentially useful," a 
defendant must "show bad faith on the part of the police" to establish a federal 
due process violation. The Tiedemann court refused to adopt Youngblood's test 
because it viewed the test as '"both too broad and too narrow."' 2007 UT 49, 
if 44. 
In formulating an analysis for lost evidence claims, the Tiedemann court 
reviewed how alleged discovery violations under rule 16, Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, are analyzed. Id. if41. When a defendant claims that the 
prosecution violated rule 16 by not disclosing evidence that it intends to 
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introduce at trial, four "nonexclusive factors" guide a trial court's evaluation of 
a motion to exclude the undisclosed evidence: 
(1) the extent to which the prosecution's representation [ of the 
existing evidence] is actually inaccurate, 
(2) the tendency of the omission or misstatement to lead defense 
counsel into tactics or strategy that could prejudice the outcome, 
(3) the culpability of the prosecutor in omitting pertinent 
information or misstating the facts, and 
( 4) the extent to which appropriate defense investigation would 
have discovered the omitted or misstated evidence. 
Id. (quoting State v. Kallin, 877 P.2d 138, 143 (Utah 1994)) (alteration in 
original). The Court observed that the "culpability or pad faith of the state" is 
only one consideration in the rule 16 analysis. Id. The Tiedemann court then 
stated that the rule 16 factors are "relevant" to a motion to dismiss based on lost 
evidence and that this balancing "approach ... should govern" such claims. Id. 
The Tiedemann court then noted its agreement with Justice Stevens' 
concurring opinion in Youngblood. Id. ,142. Although he concurred in 
Youngblood's result, Justice Stevens believed that its rule was "much broader 
than necessary." 488 U.S. at 60 (Stevens, J., concurring). He was concerned that 
there might be cases where a defendant could not prove bad faith, but where 
the loss of evidence was "nonetheless so critical to the defense as to make a 
criminal trial fundamentally unfair." Id. He also observed that it was unlikely 
that Youngblood suffered prejudice because: (1) his trial counsel had 
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emphasized that testing of the lost DNA evidence in that case might have (ii) 
exonerated Youngblood; and (2) the jury was instructed that if it found that the 
state had lost relevant evidence it could '"infer that the true fact is against the 
State's interest."' Id. at 59-60. Finally, Justice Stevens noted that, "even without 
the prophylactic sanction" of dismissal, the state "has a strong incentive to 
preserve" evidence whose true character cannot be discerned absent testing, 
because the state bears the ultimate burden of proof. Id. at 59. 
The Tiedemann court then observed that eight other states had agreed 
with Justice Steven's concurrence that Youngblood's test was too broad. 2007 UT 
49, if 42. In interpreting their due process clauses, those states had rejected the 
Youngblood analysis in favor of a balancing test in which police bad faith was 
only one consideration. Id. 
The Tiedemann court highlighted the Vermont Supreme Court's analysis, 
which requires a defendant to make the threshold showing of '"a reasonable 
possibility that the lost evidence would be exculpatory."' Id. if 43 (quoting State 
v. Delisle, 648 A.2d 632, 642-43 (Vt. 1994)). If a defendant can cross that 
threshold, a Vermont court must then balance three factors: "'(1) the degree of 
negligence or bad faith on the part of the government; (2) the importance of the 
evidence lost; and (3) other evidence of guilt adduced at trial."' Id. 
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Like the Vermont court, the Tiedemann court concluded "that some 
balancing of factors on a case-by-case basis is required." Id. ,r44. This Court 
explained that the balancing "should embrace the basic principles" previously 
"adopted under rule 16 and the factors mentioned by other states." Id. 
The Tiedemann court then announced the Utah test which, as explained, 
~ requires a trial court to balance the State's culpability in losing the evidence and 
the prejudice to the defendant, provided the defendant can first show a 
reasonable probability that the lost evidence would be exculpatory. Id. The 
Court stated: 
Id. 
In cases where a defendant has shown a reasonable probability that 
lost or destroyed evidence would be exculpatory, we find it 
necessary to require consideration of the following: (1) the reason 
for the destruction or loss of the evidence, including the degree of 
negligence or culpability on the part of the State; and (2) the degree 
of prejudice to the defendant in light of the materiality and 
importance of the missing evidence in the context of the case as a 
whole, including the strength of the remaining evidence. 
The Tiedemann court emphasized that "fundamental fairness" is the 
"touchstone" for the "balancing process." Id. ,r45. Thus, the State's behavior 
might be "so reprehensible" that a sanction would be required even where the 
prejudice was "slight or only speculative." Id. Conversely, where prejudice "is 
extreme" a sanction might be required despite a lack of any wrongdoing by the 
State. Id. The Court remanded the case to allow the trial court to apply this 
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newly-announced test. Id. ,I46. The Court directed the trial court to weigh the <;> 
two factors identified in paragraph 44, not the previously mentioned rule 16 
factors. See id. 
2. Requiring a threshold showing is consistent with 
Tiedemann' s language and structure, the intent of the Due 
Process Clause, and other states' approaches. 
Defendant argues that Tiedemann, and the cases it relied on, reject the 
requirement of a threshold showing. Br.Aplt. 16-24. Defendant misreads both 
Tiedemann and the authority that it relied on. 
While some language in Tiedemann appears to support Defendant's 
reading, closer analysis reveals that the opinion requires a defendant to make a 
threshold showing of a reasonable probability that lost evidence would be 
exculpatory before courts must engage in the balancing test. Indeed, this is how 
defense counsel here originally interpreted Tiedemann. R174:3. Counsel initially 
11 concede[ d] that there has to be some reasonable probability that [the lost 
footage] would present some exculpatory evidence," Rl74:3, but later filed a 
supplemental memorandum arguing that Tiedemann requires no threshold 
showing, R93-100. In accord with counsel's initial interpretation, however, the 
court of appeals has also consistently interpreted Tiedemann to require a 
threshold showing, as explained below. See State v. Jackson, 2010 UT App 328, 
ifiJ 19-22, 243 P.3d 902; State v. Otkovic, 2014 UT App 58, if 24,322 P.3d 746. This 
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reading is consistent with the overall language and structure of the Tiedemann 
opinion, the intent of Utah's Due Process Clause, and the approach that other 
state courts have taken under their state constitutions. 
a. Tiedemann' s language and structure. 
In introducing the Tiedemann test, the Court stated that "some balancing 
of factors on a case-by-case basis is required." 2007 UT 49, ,r44. But the Court 
spoke only in general terms of considerations that the new balancing test 
"should embrace." Id. Those general considerations were "the basic principles" 
that the Court had adopted under a rule 16 analysis, and the factors that other 
states had "mentioned." Id. 
But read in context, this general language does not r~quire a trial court to 
engage in a balancing test whenever a defendant claims that any piece of 
evidence has been lost. Although this introductory language establishes that a 
multi-factored balancing test will generally apply, it does not detail the specific 
factors that compose that test or the circumstances under which that test will 
apply. See id. Rather, that specific direction comes later. 
Although the Court did specifically mention the rule 16 analysis, it spoke 
only in terms of "the basic principles" -not the specific factors-that underlie 
that analysis. Id. And for good reason- the rule 16 factors do not lend 
themselves to wholesale incorporation into a lost evidence analysis. Rather, 
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they were designed to address a different problem: whether the prosecution 
has ambushed a defendant by failing to disclose existing inculpatory evidence 
that it intends to introduce at trial. See id. ,I41 (quoting Kallin, 877 P.2d at 143). 
For example, the first two rule 16 factors examine: (1) '"the extent to which the 
prosecution's representation [ of the existing evidence] is actually inaccurate"'; 
and (2) "' the tendency of the omission or misstatement to lead defense counsel 
into tactics or strategy that could prejudice the outcome."' Id. (alteration in 
original). But whether a defendant has had notice of and a fair opportunity to 
address the prosecution's inculpatory evidence says nothing about how the loss 
of potentially exculpatory evidence will impact her. 
The fourth rule 16 factor-whether the defendant could have discovered 
the undisclosed evidence through her own efforts - is likewise irrelevant to a 
due process claim based on lost or destroyed evidence. The likelihood that a 
defendant could have discovered evidence before the State lost or destroyed it 
is relevant only to whether the defendant could have avoided a Tiedemann claim 
altogether, not what due process requires now that the evidence is gone. 
Whether a defendant could have discovered undisclosed, but existing evidence, 
bears on whether she could have been prepared to address that undisclosed 
evidence at trial, and therefore whether it would be fundamentally unfair to 
allow the prosecution to introduce it. But the possibility that a defendant might 
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have been able to discover the evidence herself will not change the fact that the 
State ultimately lost the evidence. The fourth rule 16 factor is therefore 
unhelpful in evaluating a lost evidence claim. 
The third rule 16 factor-"'the culpability of the prosecutor in omitting 
pertinent information or misstating the facts'" -is relevant to a lost evidence 
claim, but only if framed in terms of the prosecutor's culpability in losing, 
rather than misstating, the evidence. See id. if41 (quoting Kallin, 877 P.2d at 
143). Recognizing this, the Court incorporated an analysis of the State's 
responsibility for the loss of the evidence into the first Tiedemann factor. See id. 
if 44. Thus, rather than simply co-opting the rule 16 factors as the due process 
analysis for lost evidence claims, the Tiedemann court's analysis shows that it 
incorporated "the basic principles" of those factors -the prosecutor's 
culpability and the prejudice to the defendant- as the balancing test, provided 
that a defendant can satisfy the threshold showing. See id. if 44. Tellingly, when 
the Tiedemann court remanded that case for the trial court to apply the new due 
process balancing test, it directed the trial court to consider the two factors 
identified in paragraph 44, not the rule 16 factors the Court had previously 
mentioned. See id. if 46. 
The Tiedemann court's highlighting of the Vermont test further supports 
the conclusion that Tiedemann adopted a threshold requirement as part of the 
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Utah test. As mentioned, the Tiedemann court detailed the Vermont test in the 
paragraph immediately preceding its announcement of the newly-adopted 
Utah test. Id. ,r43. The Vermont test plainly requires a threshold showing of "'a 
reasonable possibility that the lost evidence would be exculpatory."' Id. 
(quoting Delisle, 648 A.2d at 642-43). It is difficult to believe that the Court 
would highlight a test that contains a threshold requirement and then, without 
any explanation or analysis, adopt a test that omits that requirement. Id. Thus, 
the more cohesive reading of Tiedemann is that the Court highlighted the 
Vermont test as a model for the Utah test announced in the next paragraph. 
Paragraph 44 outlines the Utah test. See id. ,r44. That paragraph's 
opening sentences explain that the Court agreed with the Vermont approach 
and therefore a multi-factor balancing test would now govern lost evidence 
claims. See id. 
The final sentence of Tiedemann's paragraph 44 then announces the Utah 
test. See id. As stated, that sentence begins with the threshold requirement that 
is part of the Vermont test: 
In cases where a defendant has shown a reasonable probability that lost or 
destroyed evidence would be exculpatory, we find it necessary to 
require consideration of the following: (1) the reason for the 
destruction or loss of the evidence, including the degree of 
negligence or culpability on the part of the State; and (2) the degree 
of prejudice to the defendant in light of the materiality and 
importance of the missing evidence in the context of the case as a 
whole, including the strength of the remaining evidence. 
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Id. (emphasis added). 
Two characteristics of this sentence show that the Tiedemann court 
intended it to establish the governing test. First, as mentioned, it incorporates 
the threshold requirement from the Vermont test that the Court had just 
highlighted. Second, it details the specific factors that Utah courts must 
balance. Those factors "embrace the basic principles" of the rule 16 factors and 
"the factors mentioned by other states": the State's level of culpability, the 
importance of the evidence, and the potential impact of its loss on a defendant. 
See id. 
Defendant's attempt to find the applicable test elsewhere in Tiedemann is 
illogical. If the opening sentences of paragraph 44 establish a general balancing 
test that applies to any lost evidence claim-without any threshold showing of 
a reasonable likelihood that the evidence would be exculpatory-then 
defendants who can make that threshold showing would have a higher burden 
than those who cannot. Under Defendant's reading, a defendant who claims 
that the State lost some evidence, regardless of its nature, can obtain relief based 
on a balancing of the rule 16 factors. But defendants who can show a 
reasonable probability that the lost evidence would have been exculpatory must 
demonstrate not only that the rule 16 factors weigh in favor of dismissal, but 
that "two additional factors" do as well. Br.Aplt. 32. The Tiedemann court could 
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not have intended to make relief more difficult to obtain for defendants who 
could show that lost evidence was reasonably likely to be exculpatory, than for 
defendants who could not make that showing. 
Defendant argues in a footnote that the two Tiedemann factors in 
paragraph 44 "seem[] aimed more towards the consequences of the due process 
violation rather than whether a due process violation occurred. Br.Aplt. 33 n.5. 
But Tiedemann discussed only one remedy for the alleged due process 
violation- dismissal of the prosecution. See Tiedemann 2007 UT 49, ,r,r 10, 30, 41. 
Tiedemann assumed that if a due process violation occurred, dismissal was 
required. See id. Thus, the test outlined in paragraph 44 determines whether a 
due process violation has occurred, not what remedy to apply. Id. if 44. 
In sum, although some isolated portions of Tiedemann appear to support 
Defendant's reading, a more cohesive reading supports the conclusion that 
Tiedemann requires a threshold showing. 
b. Fundamental fairness does not guarantee access to all 
evidence regardless of its nature. 
Defendant argues that requiring a threshold showing of a reasonable 
probability that the evidence would have been exculpatory undermines 
fundamental fairness. Br.Aplt. 21. On the contrary, the fact that due process is 
grounded in fundamental fairness reinforces the conclusion that Tiedemann 




Defining the requirements of due process with precision is difficult, if not 
impossible. See Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Seros., 452 U.S. 18, 24 (1981). The 
difficulty arises because due process "is not a technical conception with a fixed 
ti, content unrelated to time, place, and circumstances; it is flexible and requires 
such procedural protections as the particular situation demands." In re Baby 
(@ Girl T., 2012 UT 78, ,16, 298 P.3d 1251 (quotation and citation omitted). 
In the context of a defendant's access to evidence, due process does not 
require that a defendant have access to every scrap of evidence, regardless of its 
nature. Rather, due process requires access only to material evidence. See State 
v. Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, ,39, 979 P.2d 799 (holding that no due process violation 
occurred where undisclosed evidence was not" constitutionally material"). 
For example, when a defendant shows that the prosecution failed to 
disclose existing evidence, a due process violation occurs only if the defendant 
can also show that the undisclosed evidence "is material to guilt or to 
@ punishment." State v. Shaffer, 725 P.2d 1301, 1304-05 (Utah 1986) (citing Brady v. 
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963)). To be "material in the constitutional sense," 
the evidence must be "'vital to the issues of whether the defendant is guilty of 
the charge."' Id. at 1305 (quoting State v. Lovato, 702 P.2d 101, 106 (Utah 1985)). 
"'The mere possibility that an item of undisclosed information might have helped 
the defense, or might have affected the outcome of the trial does not establish 
-31-
11
materiality" in the constitutional sense."' Id. (quoting Lovato, 702 P.2d at 106) 
(emphasis in original). 
But even when constitutionally material evidence goes undisclosed, due 
process entitles the defendant only to disclosure of that evidence and a retrial, 
not a dismissal. Tillman v. State, 2005 UT 56, ,r94, 128 P.3d 1123 (Brady violation 
entitled defendant to capital resentencing). Indeed, dismissal is a '1 harsh" and 
"drastic remedy." Bonneville Tower Condo. Mgmt. Comm. v. Thompson Michie 
Assocs., Inc., 728 P.2d 1017, 1020 (Utah 1986). Dismissal should be appropriate 
"only when no other sanction would reach a fair result." People v. Roan, 685 
P.2d 1369, 1371 (Colo. 1984) ( destruction of defendant's blood samples in 
vehicular homicide prosecution did not require dismissal). 
Likewise, when a defendant claims that pre-indictment delay made it 
difficult or impossible for him to access favorable evidence, he must show 
'' actual prejudice" to demonstrate a due process violation. State v. Hales, 2007 
UT 14, ,r 49-55, 152 P .3d 321. This requires a showing of something more than 
mere "speculation" that the delay resulted in a loss of favorable evidence. Id. 
,r51. 
And when a defendant claims that the government's refusal to reveal an 
informant's identity denies him access to necessary evidence, a due process 
violation occurs only if the defendant makes II some showing that disclosure of 
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an informant's identity is material and essential to his defense." State v. Nielsen, 
727 P.2d 188, 193 (Utah 1986). Again, a defendant's inability to access evidence 
that might be merely helpful is insufficient to show a due process violation. See 
id. 
The Tiedemann court recognized that "fundamental fairness" is the 
"touchstone" for analyzing whether a loss of evidence violates Utah's Due 
Process Clause. 2007 UT 49, ,I44-45. A trial has the potential to be 
fundamentally unfair only if lost evidence is exculpatory, or at least has a 
reasonable probability to be so. If the State loses neutral or inculpatory 
evidence, there is nothing fundamentally unfair about requiring a defendant to 
stand trial. Such a loss has no effect, or only a beneficial one, for that defendant. 
When there is no way to discern the actual content and character of lost 
evidence, then its potential to exculpate will always equal its potential to 
inculpate. But, as stated, a loss of evidence can be fundamentally unfair to a 
defendant only if there is at least a reasonable probability that the evidence 
would have been exculpatory. This threshold showing therefore grounds the 
Tiedemann test in the principles that Utah's Due Process Clause protects. 
Defendant argues that because the prosecution is already required to 
preserve and disclose evidence that "may be exculpatory," requiring 
defendants "to establish that the evidence was exculpatory in order to consider 
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whether state due process was violated by the destruction of the evidence" 
"add[s] nothing to the analysis." Br.Aplt. 22. But as the above due process 
cases demonstrate, it is not enough to show that evidence might have been 
exculpatory. To invoke constitutional considerations, the evidence must 
possess more than the mere possibility that it might have helped the defendant 
or affected the outcome. See Shaffer, 725 P.2d at 1305. The threshold showing is 
therefore a necessary prerequisite to invoking constitutional protection. 
Moreover, contrary to Defendant's suggestion, Tiedemann does not 
require a defendant to" establish that the evidence was exculpatory." Br.Aplt. 22 
(emphasis added). Rather, as explained, she need show only a "reasonable 
probability" that the lost evidence "would be exculpatory." Tiedemann, 2007 UT 
49, if44 (emphasis added). Without that showing, there is no way to conclude 
that her trial would be fundamentally unfair. Requiring a defendant to stand 
trial even though the prosecution has lost some of its inculpatory evidence 
would only benefit a defendant. 
c. Other states require a threshold showing. 
For this reason, other states that do not follow the Youngblood analysis 
require the same threshold showing. Defendant argues that other states that 
have abandoned the Youngblood test under their state constitutions "do not 
require a threshold showing of a reasonable probability that the evidence 
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would be exculpatory." Br.Aplt. 17. She sites to cases from Alaska, 
Connecticut, Delaware, Massachusetts, Tennessee, Vermont, and West Virginia. 
Br.Aplt. 17-18. Defendant argues that these states provide for a due process 
@ balancing "when the destroyed evidence is only 'potentially exculpatory."' 
Br.Aplt. 18. But a requirement that the evidence be "potentially exculpatory" is 
@ nevertheless a threshold showing that a defendant must satisfy to obtain a 
balancing test, even if it is less stringent than a requirement to show a 
"reasonable probability" that the evidence would be exculpatory. Again, it 
makes no sense to engage in a due process balancing test when the best that can 
be said about the evidence is that its potential to exculpate is equal to its 
potential to inculpate. 
More importantly, Defendant is wrong that Massachusetts and Vermont 
do not require a threshold showing to trigger due process balancing. On the 
contrary, and as already explained, Vermont requires a defendant to first show 
@ "'a reasonable possibility that the lost evidence would be exculpatory."' State v. 
Delisle, 648 A.2d 632, 642-43 (Vt. 1994). 
Defendant appears to base her argument that Vermont does not impose a 
threshold showing on the fact that the Delisle court required only a "reasonable 
possibility" that the lost evidence would be exculpatory. Br.Aplt. 18 (quoting 
Delisle, 648 A.2d at 642-43) (Defendant's emphasis). True, demonstrating that a 
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"reasonable possibility" exists may be easier than demonstrating that a 
"reasonable probability" exists. But lowering a hurdle does not remove the 
hurdle altogether. By requiring defendants to show a "reasonable possibility 
that the lost evidence would be exculpatory" before a court must engage in a 
balancing test, the Vermont court necessarily required that a defendant satisfy 
that threshold showing before obtaining a balancing analysis. Delisle, 648 A.2d 
at 642-43 (emphasis added). 
Likewise, contrary to Defendant's representation, the Massachusetts 
Supreme Court has explained that "it makes sense" to require a defendant to 
"bear the initial burden of demonstrating the exculpatory nature" of the 
evidence he claims the prosecution has lost. Commonwealth v. Williams, 919 
N.E.2d 685, 694 (Mass. 2010). Massachusetts has crafted a balancing test similar 
to the one that the Tiedemann court announced: weighing "the 
Commonwealth's culpability, the materiality of the evidence, and the prejudice 
to the defendant." Id. at 695. But a Massachusetts court must balance these 
factors only if a defendant meets the "threshold burden" of showing "' a 
reasonable possibility, based on concrete evidence rather than a fertile 
imagination,"' that the lost evidence would have been exculpatory. Id. at 693-94 
(quoting Comnwnwealth v. Neal, 464 N.E.2d 1356, 1364 (Mass. 1984)). 
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Defendant cites Commonwealth v. Henderson, 582 N.E.2d 496 (Mass. 1991), 
to support her claim that Massachusetts does not impose a threshold 
requirement. Br.Aplt. 18. Defendant is mistaken. Besides predating Williams, 
Henderson explicitly recognizes that the defendant had demonstrated "the 
reasonable possibility" that the lost evidence in his case would have been 
exculpatory. 582 N.E.2d at 497. 
Henderson was charged with robbery after the victim, who was then 
serving as a juror in a different case where Henderson was the defendant, 
claimed to recognize him as her robber. Id. at 497. The identification happened 
more than two years after the robbery. Id. The trial court granted Henderson's 
motion to dismiss because the police had lost the written description of the 
assailant that the victim had provided when the crime occurred. Id. at 496-97. 
The Henderson court never detailed the Massachusetts test for evaluating 
lost evidence claims in its brief, seven-paragraph opinion. Id. at 496-97. But it 
did note that the trial court had explicitly found that Henderson had 
demonstrated "the reasonable possibility" that the lost description "could have 
been used to impeach the identifying witness." Id. Henderson therefore 
supports the conclusion that Massachusetts does require a threshold showing 
for lost evidence claims. But even if Henderson did not, the Massachusetts 
Supreme Court's subsequent opinion in Williams unambiguously states that a 
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defendant who moves for dismissal based on the state's loss of evidence must 
"bear the initial burden of demonstrating the exculpatory nature" of the lost 
evidence. 919 N.E.2d at 694. 
Like Vermont, Massachusetts, and Utah, New Mexico also requires a 
defendant to make a threshold showing. State v. Riggs, 838 P.2d 975, 978 (N.M. 
1992). Under Riggs, a defendant must show that the lost evidence II is in some 
way determinative of guilt" before a defendant can show a due process 
violation. Id. Tiedemann' s threshold requirement is therefore consistent with 
these states' approaches. 
Defendant argues that she should not be required to make a threshold 
showing because it is difficult to do so when the evidence no longer exists. 
Br.Aplt. 18-19. She cites Delisle from Vermont, and cases from Alaska, 
Connecticut, and Delaware, as recognizing this difficulty. Br.Aplt. at 19. But as 
explained, despite this acknowledged difficulty, the Delisle court nevertheless 
required Vermont defendants to make a threshold showing. See 648 A.2d at 
642-43. 
A threshold requirement does not undermine due process. Due process 
requires that a defendant be treated fairly, not that she be excused from ever 
bearing any difficult burden. As the United States Supre1ne Court has 
recognized, the Federal Due Process Clause does not require an "ideal" system 
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that guards "against every possible hardship that may befall." Ownbey v. 
Morgan, 256 U.S. 94, 110 (1921). 
Moreover, Tiedemann's "reasonable probability" standard accounts for the 
difficulty of establishing the actual nature of lost evidence. Tiedemann requires 
that a defendant show only a "reasonable probability" that the evidence would 
be exculpatory, not that it in fact would be. See 2007 UT 49, 144. 
This would not have been difficult to do in this case had there been 
credible evidence to support Defendant's claim that the footage would have 
supported her version of the events. Defendant could have used testimony 
from other inmates, prison officers, or even herself to satisfy Tiedemann's 
threshold showing. Defendant's difficulty arose not from the nature of the 
threshold showing, but from the fact that no credible evidence supported her 
version of the events. 
Defendant argues that a threshold "reasonable probability" requirement 
~ encourages destruction of evidence because the evidence then becomes only 
'"potentially useful."' Br.Aplt. 21. (quoting Thorne v. Dep't. of Pub. Safety, 774 
P.2d 1326, 1331 n.9 (Alaska 1989)). But the State "has strong incentive to 
preserve the evidence" because it bears the burden of proof and it risks 
dismissal whenever critical evidence is lost. Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 
59 (Stevens, J ., concurring). Moreover, Tiedemann requires a trial court to 
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examine the reasons for the loss or destruction of evidence, including the State's 
culpability. See 2007 UT 49, if 44. That factor would weigh heavily in favor of 
dismissal if a State agent were to intentionally destroy evidence that was 
reasonably likely to be exculpatory. 
Thus, a threshold showing is consistent with Tiedemann's language and 
structure, the due process focus on fundamental fairness, and other states' 
approaches. 
3. The court of appeals' interpretation of Tiedemann has been 
consistent. 
Defendant argues that the Utah Court of Appeals has been inconsistent in 
interpreting whether Tiedemann requires a threshold showing. Br.Aplt. 14-15 & 
n.1. She contends that in State v. Jackson, 2010 UT App 328, ,r,r10, 19-21, 243 
P.3d 902, the court of appeals "simply balanced the factors as required by 
Tiedemann" without requiring a threshold showing, but later "misinterpreted 
Tiedemann to require a threshold showing" in State v. Otkovic, 2014 UT App 58, 
if 24,322 P.2d 746. Br.Aplt. 14-15 & n.1. Defendant misreads Jackson. 
Jackson hit his estranged girlfriend with his car, then backed up and 
appeared to be maneuvering to hit her again. 2010 UT App. 328, if 2. The 
victim's son, who was accompanied by his pit bull dog, gave the dog to his 
mother and tried to stop Jackson by opening the front passenger door of 
Jackson's car and trying to hit him. Id. Jackson pulled a knife and cut and 
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stabbed the son and, as the son retreated, continued to chase and stab him. Id. 
13. On seeing this, the victim released the pit bull, which chased Jackson. Id. 
Jackson stabbed the dog in the throat, attacked the victim again, and fled. Id. 
Before trial, the State released Jackson's car to the lienholder, who cleaned 
and sold it before Jackson could examine it. Id. 15. Jackson moved to dismiss, 
~ arguing that he intended to argue self-defense and that the State had violated 
his due process rights by allowing evidence "crucial" to that theory to be 
destroyed. Id. Jackson argued that he could have shown that there was canine 
blood in the car, which "would have corroborated his claim that the pit bull 
attacked him." Id. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss and Jackson 
appealed. Id. 115, 19. 
In explaining the Tiedemann test, the court of appeals first stated that 
"courts should consider the 'nonexclusive factors' outlined in rule 16 of the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure." Id. 120 (quoting Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, 
viJ 141). The court also quoted those factors. Id. The court of appeals then stated: 
"Additionally, if a defendant establishes 'a reasonable probability that lost or 
destroyed evidence would be exculpatory,' courts also need to consider" (1) the 
State's culpability for the loss and (2) the prejudice to the defendant. Id. 
(quoting Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, 144). 
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Defendant reads Jackson as requiring a balancing of the rule 16 factors 
whenever a defendant asserts a lost evidence claim under Tiedemann, regardless 
of the nature of the evidence. Br.Aplt. 15 n.1. But that is not what Jackson held. 
Granted, the court of appeals did not explicitly analyze whether Jackson 
had satisfied Tiedemann' s threshold requirement by showing that the lost blood 
evidence was reasonably likely to be exculpatory. But the court did not excuse 
Jackson from that requirement. Rather, it assumed that Jackson had made that 
threshold showing. See Jackson, 2010 UT App 328, 1iJ5, 20-21. 
The court of appeals set the stage for its analysis by acknowledging 
Jackson's argument that the blood evidence in the car "was crucial to his self-
defense theory." Id. ,IS. The court further explained that Jackson had claimed 
"that the car may have contained some of the pit bull's blood, which blood 
allegedly would have supported his self-defense theory by potentially 
establishing that the son and pit bull attacked first." Id. ,f 21. 
The court then limited its analysis to the two factors that a court must 
analyze only after a defendant has satisfied the threshold showing. Id. ,I,r21-22. 
The court of appeals never analyzed the rule 16 factors. Id. 
The court of appeals' analysis therefore assumed that Jackson had made a 
threshold showing of a reasonable probability that the lost blood evidence 
would be exculpatory, and then limited its analysis accordingly. See id. ,I,rS, 21-
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22. Jackson is therefore consistent with the court of appeals' later explanation of 
Tiedemann in Otkovic, where the court held that to prevail on a motion to 
dismiss based on lost evidence, "a defendant must first demonstrate as a 
@ threshold matter, that there is 'a reasonable probability that lost or destroyed 
evidence would be exculpatory."' 2014 UT App 58, 124. 
B. The trial court correctly concluded that Tiedemann did not 
require dismissal. 
Defendant argues that she is entitled to dismissal under Tiedemann. 
@ Br.Aplt. 23. She first argues that the rule 16 factors-which the trial court did 
not analyze, but should have under her reading of Tiedemann-weigh in favor 
of dismissal. Br.Aplt. 24-32. Defendant alternatively argues that, contrary to 
the trial court's ruling, she satisfied Tiedemann's threshold requirement to 
demonstrate a reasonable probability that the lost footage would have been 
exculpatory, and further demonstrated that a balancing of (1) the reasons for 
the loss, and (2) the prejudice to her, required dismissal. Br.Aplt. 32-49. 
1. The trial court correctly concluded that Defendant had not 
satisfied Tiedemann' s threshold showing. 
The trial court correctly concluded that Defendant had not satisfied 
Tiedemann's threshold requirement because she produced no credible evidence 
of a reasonable probability that the lost surveillance footage would have been 
exculpatory. R134-35 (Add. A). A reasonable probability that a particular 
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circumstance exists cannot rest on evidence that is not credible. See State v. 
Virgin, 2006 UT 29, ifif24, 36-37, 137 P.3d 787 (evidence that is not credible 
cannot establish a reasonable belief that defendant committed the crime and 
should therefore be bound over for trial). Because Defendant produced no 
credible evidence to support her claim that the lost footage would have 
supported her version of events, the trial court correctly found that Defendant 
had not shown a reasonable probability that the footage would have been 
exculpatory. R134-35 (Add. A). 
Defendant argues that the trial court II could not make credibility 
determinations" in deciding whether she carried her burden under Tiedemann. 
Br.Aplt. 39. But when a legal standard incorporates a showing of 
reasonableness, it "strongly suggests that [ a trial court] must, to a certain extent, 
assess the credibility of the evidence presented." Virgin, 2006 UT 29, if 24. And 
at an evidentiary hearing, the trial court is the factfinder II and as such, is the 
sole arbiter of the credibility of witnesses." State v. Ballenberger, 652 P.2d 927, 
929 n.6 (Utah 1982). Moreover, the trial court's ruling did not usurp the jury's 
role as the ultimate factfinder. As the trial court recognized, although it found 
Defendant's witness not credible, its ruling would still allow the jury to judge 
for itself whether the witnesses were credible and whether the 1nissing footage 
was likely to corroborate Defendant's story. R134-35. 
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Defendant argues that a few lines of Officer Hansen's testimony 
supported her claim that the lost footage would have supported her version. 
Br.Aplt. 25, 38-39. She argues that Hansen gave conflicting testimony about 
Inmate Kahn's location during the assault, testifying at the evidentiary hearing 
that Kahn was four to six feet behind him as he approached Defendant and she 
kicked him, but testifying earlier at the preliminary hearing that Kahn was "on 
[his] back" and he did not know 11exactly where she was." Br.Aplt. 25 (quoting 
R70;R175:3,4-5). Defendant argues that this snippet of Hansen's preliminary 
hearing testimony supports her version that she was merely defending herself 
from Kahn's aggression when she kicked Hansen. Br.Aplt. 25, 38-39. 
Defendant demonstrates no conflict in Officer Hansen's testimony. As 
stated, Officer Hansen explained that when he testified on cross at the 
preliminary hearing that Kahn was "on [his] back" and that he did not know 
exactly where Kahn was, he was testifying based on his knowledge of Kahn's 
@ location at that point in the ongoing altercation, not on what he saw when he 
watched the surveillance footage. R175:5-6. Hansen never contradicted his 
testimony that the surveillance footage showed Kahn four to six feet behind 
him and "backing off" when Defendant looked him in the eye and kicked him 
twice. R175:3,6. Indeed, the trial court found Hansen's testimony to be 
credible. R138. 
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Because there was no conflict in Hansen's testimony, his testimony did @ 
not support Defendant's claim that the lost footage would have supported her 
story. The trial court therefore correctly found that Defendant presented no 
credible evidence that the lost footage would have been exculpatory. R134-35 
(Add. A). 
Defendant argues that the trial court required too high of a showing by 
demanding that she "present extrinsic proof that the video was in fact 
exculpatory." Br.Aplt. 32. But the trial court did not demand proof that the lost 
footage "was in fact exculpatory." Rather, the court analyzed whether 
Defendant had shown a "'reasonable probability' that [the] lost or destroyed 
evidence would be exculpatory." R133 (quoting Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, ,144) 
(emphasis added). This is all that Tiedemann, and the trial court, required. 2007 
UT 49, ,I44. 
Relying on her misstatement that Tiedemann and the trial court required 
proof that the lost footage was in fact exculpatory, Defendant argues that this 
standard is impossible to satisfy because when evidence no longer exists, "a 
defendant is precluded from proving its exculpatory content." Br.Aplt. 34. But 
as explained, Tiedemann recognizes and accounts for the difficulty of proving 
the precise nature of lost evidence by requiring only a showing of a fl reasonable 
probability" that the evidence would be exculpatory. 2007 UT 49, if 44. 
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Defendant could have met her burden here with credible testimony from 
herself or other witnesses. 
Defendant asserts that "requiring her" to prove a reasonable probability 
that the lost footage would have been exculpatory "misreads Tiedemann." 
Br.Aplt. 34. On the contrary, Tiededmann plainly placed on Defendant the 
~ burden of making this showing. See 2007 UT 49, ,I44. Requiring a defendant to 
carry that initial burden makes sense, because only a defendant can articulate 
how the lost evidence would support her defense theory. 
Defendant argues that there was a reasonable probability that the lost 
footage would have been exculpatory because prison officials did not save it 
even though it would have conclusively established what happened. Br.Aplt. 
40-41. Defendant suggests that this should create an inference that the footage 
11 must have been favorable to the defense." Br.A pit. 41. But Tiedemann 
recognizes that the mere fact that potentially helpful evidence is lost is not 
@ enough. See 2007 UT 49, ,r44. Rather, as explained, due process is not 
implicated unless there is II a reasonable probability that [the] lost or desh·oyed 
evidence would be exculpatory." Id. Absent this showing, the best that can be 
said about the evidence is that its potential to exculpate is equal to its potential 
to inculpate. But that is not enough to demonstrate a fundamental unfairness. 
-47-
Moreover, all of the credible evidence here demonstrated that the lost 
footage would not have been favorable to the defense but instead would have 
conclusively proven the State's case. As the trial court therefore recognized, the 
prosecution likely regretted that it could not present this evidence as II the 
figurative 'Exhibit A"' in its case against Defendant. R136. All of the credible 
evidence before the trial court demonstrated that had the footage not been lost, 
the prosecution would not have had to settle for a compromise by offering 
Defendant a plea deal that required a recommendation that her sentence run 
concurrent. 
In sum, the trial court correctly found that Defendant did not meet 
Tiedemann's threshold showing because she provided no credible evidence that 
the lost footage would have been exculpatory. R134-35 (Add. A). This was 
reason enough to deny Defendant's motion. 
2. Alternatively, the trial court correctly concluded that 
Defendant had not shown that a weighing of Tiedemann's 
factors required dismissal. 
The trial court nevertheless concluded that even if Defendant had met 
Tiedemann' s threshold requirement, she did not show that a balancing of 
Tiedemann's two factors established a due process violation requiring dismissal. 
R135-38. Defendant argues that the trial court erred in weighing these factors 
because the State's actions "went beyond mere negligence" and the loss of the 
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video was prejudicial because it was central to the issue of guilt. Br.Aplt. 28, 43, 
45-46. Defendant also argues that a weighing of the rule 16 factors 
demonstrates that dismissal was required. Br.Aplt. 24-32. 
1. Dismissal was not required under the two Tiedemann 
factors. 
The trial court correctly weighed Tiedemann' two factors. Defendant 
argues that the first factor - "' the reason for the destruction or loss of the 
evidence, including the degree of negligence or culpability on the part of the 
~ State"' -favors dismissal. Br.Aplt. 41 (quoting Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, 144). 
She contends that the prison's lack of a policy for retaining recordings of 
incidents, the failures by multiple prison officials to retain a copy of the footage, 
and the importance of the lost footage, all establish that the conduct here was 
more than mere negligence. Br.Aplt. 28-31. But defense counsel conceded 
below that the State only "acted negligently by not preserving this evidence." 
R43. And Defendant does not challenge on appeal any of the trial court's 
factual findings about how the footage was lost. Br.Aplt. 28-31. Those findings 
amply support the trial court's conclusion that "the reasons for the loss of the 
Ci} evidence favor the State rather than dismissal of the charges." R138. 
As explained, the trial court found that the footage was not "intentionally 
@ eliminated, or recorded over." R137. Rather, the loss was due to "negligence 
born of a multitude of factors," including "the press of other business" "and the 
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fact that many personnel are involved in a setting such as a prison control unit." 
R137. The trial court also found that the prison investigator's explanation for 
the loss wa:s "believable" and amounted II to negligence but not in a high 
degree." R137. 
The fact that the prison does not have an established policy for saving 
surveillance footage does not elevate the conduct here to something beyond 
negligence. There was no evidence that prison officials intentionally chose not 
to implement a policy so as to disadvantage inmates whose crimes are captured 
on the surveillance cameras. R137. Nor does the fact that multiple prison 
officials were involved elevate the State's culpability beyond negligence. As the 
trial court found, the involvement of various prison officers reduced, rather 
than heightened, those officers' liability. R137. 
Nor does the fact that the lost footage would have been highly probative 
undermine the trial court's analysis. Indeed, the trial court recognized that the 
footage "was clearly relevant" and should have been retained. R138. No 
evidence suggested that prison officials wanted to destroy the footage or lose it. 
On the contrary, and as the trial court found, the prison investigator made 
efforts to obtain a copy of the footage, but "the press of other business" delayed 
her ability to timely follow up. R135-38. Contrary to Defendant's suggestion, 
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the State "has strong incentive to preserve the evidence" because it bears the 
burden at trial. Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 59 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
Additionally, all of the credible evidence before the trial court showed 
@ that the footage would have done nothing but help the prosecution. The 
prosecution would have welcomed the opportunity to support its case with a 
video which showed Defendant intentionally kicking Officer Hansen while 
Inmate Kahn was four to six feet away. R130. The probative value of the lost 
footage therefore favors the State, not Defendant. 
The trial court also correctly found that Tiedemann's second factor-the 
degree of prejudice to Defendant- favored the State. R136. As explained, 
Defendant presented no credible evidence that the lost footage would have 
supported her version of the altercation. R136. All of the credible evidence 
before the trial court therefore showed that the only party that suffered any 
prejudice from the loss of the footage was the prosecution, not Defendant. 
Additionally, the lost footage was not the only evidence of what occurred 
during the assault. Other eyewitnesses, including Defendant herself, were 
available to testify about the events. Although the surveillance footage would 
have been important evidence, it merely would have corroborated, or not, the 
eyewitness testimony. 
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Defendant argues that she was prejudiced because the loss of the footage 
led her to plead guilty, rather than going to trial. Br.Aplt. 27. She contends that 
without the surveillance footage, she had no choice but to plead guilty because 
the State's case would have been based on the testimony from a prison guard, 
while her defense would have been based on a witness that the trial court had 
determined not to be credible. Br.Aplt. 27. But this argument presumes that the 
video would have been exculpatory-a fact that no credible evidence supports. 
Defendant therefore produced no evidence that she suffered any prejudice. 
Moreover, as noted, the jury would not have heard the judge's credibility 
finding and would have had the opportunity to assess the witnesses' credibility 
for itself. 
In short, even if Defendant had satisfied Tiedemann' s threshold showing, 
the trial court nevertheless correctly concluded that Defendant had not 
demonstrated that dismissal was required based on a balancing of the two 
Tiedemann factors. 
2. If the trial court was required to balance the rule 16 
factors, this Court should remand to allow it to do so; 
alternatively, those factors favor the State. 
As explained, Defendant argues that the trial court erroneously neglected 
its obligation to balance the rule 16 factors, and that had it done so, it would 
have been required to dismiss the case. Br.Aplt. 24-32. She therefore asks this 
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Court to reverse her conviction and dismiss the charge. Br.Aplt. 49. But if 
Defendant is correct that Tiedemann requires a balancing of the rule 16 factors 
whenever evidence is lost, regardless of its nature, then the appropriate remedy 
~ is not to reverse and remand for a dismissal. Rather, this Court should reverse 
and remand for the trial court to analyze the rule 16 factors. Indeed, after this 
Court announced in Tiedemann the new test for analyzing lost evidence claims 
under the Utah Constitution, it remanded to allow the trial court to apply the 
new two-factored test. See 2007 UT 49, if 46. 
But if this Court chooses to analyze the rule 16 factors in the first instance, 
it should hold that those factors favor the State, not Defendant. The first 
factor-"'the extent to which the prosecution's representation [of the existing 
evidence] is actually inaccurate"' -favors the State. Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, if41 
(quoting State v. Kallin, 877 P.2d 138, 143 (Utah 1994)). There is no evidence that 
the State represented that a copy of the footage existed. Rather, the prosecutor 
@ told Defendant that the prison could not produce any footage of the assault. 
R25. Defendant faults the prosecutor for not explaining that footage did exist, 
but was lost. Br.Aplt. 26. But Defendant learned that fact almost a year before 
she pled guilty. R25,150. In fact, the loss of the footage was the basis of her pre-
trial motion to dismiss. R37-44. Thus, the prosecutor did not mislead 
Defendant about what evidence the State possessed, and what it did not. 
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Rather than focusing on whether evidence existed or not, Defendant 
argues that the State misrepresented the substance of the existing evidence 
because Officer Hansen gave conflicting testimony when he testified at the 
preliminary that Inmate Kahn was behind him, and then later testified that he 
did not know where she was. Br.Aplt. 25. But as explained, there was no 
conflict in Hansen's testimony. More importantly, this factor examines whether 
the State has misrepresented whether certain evidence exists, not whether there 
might be internal conflicts within evidence that the Defendant knows exists. See 
Kallin, 877 P.2d at 143. Thus, the first rule 16 factor favors the State. 
So does the second. It examines "' the tendency of the omission or 
misstatement to lead defense counsel into tactics or strategy that could 
prejudice the outcome."' See Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, if41 (quoting Kallin, 877 
P.2d at 143). As explained, the prosecution made no omission or misstatement 
regarding the state of the existing evidence. Thus, there is no basis for 
Defendant to claim that any prosecutorial omission or misstatement about the 
existing evidence negatively affected her trial strategy. For example, Defendant 
cannot claim that she pied guilty because the State represented that it had a 
copy of surveillance footage showing her intentionally kicking Officer Hansen, 
when it actually did not. 
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Q 
Defendant again argues that her guilty plea is evidence of prejudice 
because without the footage, her trial would have boiled down to Officer 
Hansen's testimony against the testimony of an inmate that the trial court had 
already found not to be credible. Br.Aplt. 27. But this difficulty for Defendant 
arose not because of a prosecutorial omission or misstatement about the 
existing evidence, but from the loss of the footage itself. That is something that 
the second Tiedemann factor considers, but not something that is relevant to the 
second rule 16 factor. In any event, as explained, Defendant's argument that 
her guilty plea is evidence of prejudice incorrectly presumes that the footage 
would have supported Defendant's version of the events. 
The third rule 16 factor also favors the State. It considers "'the culpability 
of the prosecutor in omitting pertinent information or misstating the facts."' See 
Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, ,I41 (quoting Kallin, 877 P.2d at 143). As explained, the 
prosecutor omitted no pertinent information and made no misstatement. 
Moreover, as shown, the trial court correctly found that the footage was lost 
due merely "to negligence but not in a high degree." R137. 
Finally, as explained, the fourth rule 16 factor-"'the extent to which 
appropriate defense investigation would have discovered the omitted or 
misstated evidence'" -is irrelevant in a lost evidence situation. Tiedemann, 2007 
UT 49, if41 (quoting Kallin, 877 P.2d at 143). Even if a defendant might have 
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been able to discover the evidence herself, a lost evidence claim under 
Tiedemann arises because the State has lost that evidence and neither party can 
use it at trial. Thus, the issue is not whether a defendant could have discovered 
the evidence, but whether the State's loss of the evidence amounts to a due 
process violation. There is no dispute that Defendant here could not have 
discovered and preserved the surveillance footage because she was not charged 
with assault until three and a-half months after the assault. Rl-2. The fourth 
rule 16 factor is therefore irrelevant, or at best, unhelpful, in evaluating a lost 
evidence claim. Thus, even if this Court were to analyze the rule 16 factors in 
the first instance, none of the relevant factors favor dismissal of Defendant's 
charge. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted on February 16, 2016. 
SEAN D. REYES 
Utah Attorney General 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellee 
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Addendum A 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL f!im®Wl'~§') . 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY/ JAN ·-' T r,ou~r 
WEST JORDAN DEPARTMENT, STATE OF ~ST l r 20/5 
JO D DEPT, 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LISSETTE MARIAN DEJESUS 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No. 141400093 
Judge BRUCE C. LUBECK 
DATE: January 21, 2015 
The above matter came before the court for decision an 
v.J Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. 
BACKGROUND 
Defendant was charged by an information filed January 14, 
2014 with assault by a prisoner. The charge in summary is that 
on September 27, 2013, while an inmate at the Utah State Prison, 
defendant assaulted a guard, Robert Hansen (Hansen) with intent 
to cause bodily injury. After preliminary hearing and a 
bindover, defendant entered a plea of not guilty. On September 
12, 2014, defendant filed a motion to dismiss, arguing in summary 
that the State had destroyed evidence which merited a dismissal 
i.iJ of the case. The State filed an opposition on September 24, 
2014. Defendant filed a reply on October 6, 2014. Oral argument 
was set for October 7, 2014. 
The court heard argument and determined it needed 
additional factual evidence, and scheduled an evidentiary hearing 
000126 
for November 4, 2014, but that was postponed until December 2, 
2014, by agreement _of the parties. On November 26, 2014, and 
given the holiday, in effect one day before the December 2 
hearing, defendant filed a supplemental memorandum in support of 
her motion to dismiss. At that hearing on December 2, 2014, the 
court heard evidence and received further argument and again 
determined it needed additional evidence and the State requested 
additional time to respond to the supplemental memorandum of 
defendant recently filed. The court thus scheduled hearing and 
argument for December 18, 2014, but due to an emergency a witness 
was unavailable and further evidence and argument was heard on 
January 15, 2015. 
Throughout each of these hearings defendant was present with 
Wesley J. Howard and the State was present through Coleen K. 
Witt. 
The court heard argument at each of the three hearings. The 
court has considered all of the pleadings filed, including the 
attachments which include the transcript of the preliminary 
hearing and other materials and argument. On January 15, 2015, 
the court took the issues under advisement. Now being fully 
advised, the court issues this memorandum decision. 
-2- 000127 
Q 
Based on the above, the court makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Defendant was an inmate at the Utah State Prison on 
September 27, 2013 in what is called Timpanogas 3, a female 
~ housing unit at the Utah State Prison. Defendant shared a cell 
number 416 with an inmate named Dash. Dash and Khan, a resident 
of cell number 415, were being escorted back to their cells by 
Hansen after recreation time and defendant was in her cell, 
number 416, which is on the second tier and adjacent to number 
415. When the doors were opened defendant came out of her cell 
and defendant and Khan engaged in some form of combat. (The court 
is not making any findings, of course, with respect to guilt or 
innocence, but only for this motion.) Khan had been instructed 
to go to her cell #415 as Hansen followed but instead went to 
stand in front of defendant's cell #416. Hansen then attempted to 
insert himself between the defendant and Khan. Hansen pulled 
defendant off and tried to push defendant back into her cell and 
that failed and defendant came out of her cell again and Hansen 
threw defendant to the ground. Hansen testified at the 
preliminary hearing that defendant then kicked him twice, in the 
abdomen and groin area, after looking him in the eye. Hansen said 
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on direct examination Khan was not anywhere near that area. On 
cross examination he said he did not see Kahn when defendant 
kicked him, Khan was behind Hansen, not on his shoulder, but 
Hansen could not see Khan. 
2. The prison maintains a system of cameras which captured 
the events on a digital recorder, similar to a home digital video 
recorder, or DVR. It is not a video tape where an actual, 
physical recording is made. That device runs continuously until 
it is "full" and then other events shown on the cameras are 
captured "over" older images. It is not a permanent record 
unless someone has the Information Technology (IT) department at 
the Department of Corrections make, or "burn" a disc from that 
recording device. Thus after approximately 30 days, though there 
is no formal policy in place, unless the images selected are 
copied onto a permanent medium, such as a compact disc, the 
images captured temporarily are gone and irretrievable as they 
are "recorded'' over or eliminated in some way not provided to the 
court by the evidence. 
3. Defendant's factual claim is that as Hansen was inserting 
himself between Khan and the defendant Khan continued to attempt 
to strike and harm defendant, and defendant in protecting herself 
from Khan accidently struck Hansen without intent to cause bodily 




4. Hansen told his supervisor immediately after the event 
and wrote a report of the incident. The investigations division 
contacted Hansen later that same day and he gave them a statement 
as to what had occurred and received Hansen's written report. 
Hansen, within an hour after the alleged assault on September 27, 
2013, viewed the recording which was inside the control unit, he 
played it back and could observe it. He testified that it showed 
~ that defendant kicked him and while doing so, Khan was 
approximately 4-6 behind Hansen and was not doing anything 
against defendant, merely standing behind Hansen while defendant 
~ and Hansen were engaged in their altercation. Hansen said when he 
told counsel on cross examination that he did not know where Kahn 
was, that was based on what he knew at that time it was 
transpiring, but viewing the recording made him aware Kahn was 4-
6 feet behind him and was not engaging defendant when defendant 
kicked Hansen. 
5. An investigator, Kemp, was assigned the case and spoke 
with the witnesses shortly after the event, including Hansen. 
~ Kemp asked someone, an employee Kemp did not know, in the control 
unit to get her, Kemp, a copy of the recording. Kemp does not 
actually work inside the prison and does not know the names of 
~ the personnel and did not note it. Kemp is an investigator who 
investigates offenses within and without the prison involving 
Department of Corrections interests. At some point after 30 days 
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from the event, but on a date unknown, Kemp asked someone, again 
not recalling who, about the recording. Kemp was told by a 
captain on the unit that the record was not available and that if 
a hard copy had been made, it was lost. No one, in short, knows 
if in fact a hard copy recording was made but no one claims it 
exists. Kemp and other investigators at that time of the event 
and for about three months afterwards, was given an assignment to 
perform background checks which kept her unusually busy beyond 
what her normal duties required. 
6. In part based on the press of that other business, the 
case was not brought to the office of the District Attorney 
{prosecution) until January 7, 2014, by which time the images 
captured on the recording device were eliminated and 
irretrievably lost. The case was filed shortly thereafter, as 
noted. Defendant filed a discovery request on or about January 
29, 2014, asking for any video recordings of the event. The 
State responded and stated on or about May 1, 2014, that it was 
"unable to provide any video of the incident as none exist as per 
the Utah State Prison." 
7. Defendant's cell mate Dash was called as a witness at 
the evidentiary hearing of December 2, 2014. She refused to talk 
about the incident and cited the Fifth Amendment. The court 
observed defendant when that occurred and as Dash left the stand. 
Defendant pulled faces and made facial expressions as if to 
-6-
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question what Dash had just done in open court. The meaning of 
the interchange is uncertain to the court. 
8. Another female inmate, Atata, testified at that same 
hearing that she was in another cell on the tier and observed 
Khan behind Hansen and that Khan was reaching toward defendant 
~ 
and trying to strike defendant when defendant hit Hansen. Atata 
·has a close relationship with defendant. Atata describes 
~ defendant as her, Atata's, fiance. The court does not accept as 
true the testimony of Atata. That is not based solely on the 
relationship between Atata and defendant, but the court also 
~ observed defendant and Atata while Atata was testifying. It 
appeared to the court, and the court so finds, that defendant was 
making facial gestures and expressions of varying sorts to Atata 
depending on what Atata was saying in her testimony. Further, 
Atata admitted she was looking at the event from an angle, as she 
was in another cell, and Atata admitted she did not see 
everything but saw most of the event. The court thus does not 
accept her testimony at face value as being testimony the court 
can rely on to find the events were as she described. 
Based on the above findings, the court enters these: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW and DISCUSSION 
The law is set forth in State v. Tiedemann, 162 P.3d 1106 
-7-
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(UT. 2007). When there is a claim by a defendant that evidence is 
lost or destroyed, the court is to engage in a multi-step 
process. This court must engage in a balancing of factors. The 
defendant must first demonstrate a "reasonable probability" that 
lost or destroyed evidence would be exculpatory. It is not 
sufficient to show a possibility that the evidence would be 
exculpatory. If a "reasonable probability" is shown, then the 
court is to consider the reason for the destruction or loss or 
failure of preservation of the evidence, including the degree of 
negligence or culpability on the part of the State, and the 
decree of prejudice to the defendant in light of the materiality 
and importance of the missing evidence in the context of the case 
as a whole, including the strength of the remaining evidence. 
The main principle is fundamental fairness. The Utah Supreme 
Court noted that if a sanction is warranted, it could be because 
of the serious conduct of the State or the degree of prejudice to 
the defendant. Trial courts are instructed to balance the factors 
to insure fairn~ss. 
The court must first examine, as a threshold, whether 
defendant has demonstrated that it is reasonably probable that 
the recording would be exculpatory. Just what is "reasonably 
probable" is not as clear as the court would like. Here, 
defendant produced a witness, her fiance Atata, who said Khan was 
engaged in fighting with defendant when defendant struck Hansen. 
-8- 000133 
© 
The court is aware at this point only of the preliminary hearing 
testimony and other testimony given by Hansen on December 2, 
2014, as well as that of Dash and Atata on that same date. 
Whether there are other witnesses, prison staff or inmates, who 
will at trial describe what they observed that day, if there are 
any such witnesses, is unknown to the court. Of course the 
parties are free to produce whatever witnesses they believe have 
relevant information. 
The court gives little credit, at this point, based on its 
observations of Atata, defendant, and their relationship, to the 
testimony of Atata. Simply asserting that the recording would be 
helpful to defendant is obviously nothing more than argument that 
possibly the recording would be exculpatory. There must be 
something in the evidence before the court NOW that shows the 
court there is some reasonable basis on which to believe the 
recording would show what defendant claims, that the striking of 
Hansen was either an accident while defendant was trying to 
engage in combat with Khan or that the striking was justified or 
occurred for some reason other than as claimed by Hansen that it 
was done to inflict bodily injury intentionally or knowingly. The 
only possible evidence defendant can assert that is now before 
the court is the testimony of Atata. To be reasonable evidence, 
to this court, that evidence must be believable. To this court, 
based on the findings above, the testimony was not believable and 
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thus is not reasonable. A jury may well conclude differently, 
however, and the court's belief at this point of course is 
irrelevant to what may be presented at a jury trial. The court 
is not indicating such evidence cannot be presented by defendant 
at a trial. The court is merely ruling that defendant has not 
shown a reasonable probability that the recording would be 
exculpatory. 
Thus, the court does not need to examine the reasons for the 
destruction or failure to preserve nor must the court determine 
the degree of prejudice suffered by defendant, if any. However, 
even if it is reasonably probable that the recording is 
exculpatory, the reasons for its non-existence do not support a 
dismissal. IF the court is wrong about the exculpatory nature of 
the recording, dismissal is not appropriate because of the facts 
and circumstances which resulted in the failure to preserve. 
First, in the court's view the State is incorrect about the 
destruction of the evidence and motivations. Obviously the 
"prosecution" here has done absolutely nothing to destroy or fail 
to preserve evidence. The destruction came about by the action, 
or inaction, of the Department of Corrections personnel in 
failing to preserve evidence that was readily available at the 
time of the incident. The recording was gone before the case was 
filed. The State argued wrongly, respectfully, and contrary to 
common sense frankly, about motivations. If the recording showed 
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exactly as Hansen said, certainly it would seem to this court 
that common sense would indicate that recording would be 
retained, the figurative "Exhibit A", so to speak, in the case 
against defendant. The motivation, frankly, to destroy or fail 
to preserve such a recording would come if the recording 
supported some other factual situation than the one Hansen 
describes. If it showed contrary to what Hansen said, then it 
would make more logical sense to destroy it rather than if it 
supported him. The court does not believe that the lack of the 
evidence, however, is related to any "decision" made by anyone. 
Obviously, it is very difficult, if not impossible, for this 
court to understand why prison personnel would not, with full 
knowledge that a claimed assault had occurred by an inmate 
against a guard, maintain a recording of that event. Obviously, 
if the recording shows what Hansen testified it shows, there is 
no prejudice at all to defendant in the destruction of the 
recording. Only if the recording shows in essence what defendant 
claims would there be prejudice by its unavailablity. Because 
this court does not believe defendant has shown any reasonable, 
believable probability the recording showed what defendant 
claims, it does not matter why or how it was destroyed, or more 
properly not retained. But, as indicated, the court is 
discussing that element in the event the court is incorrect about 
the exculpatory nature of the event. More responsible conduct by 
-11-
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the investigative team, and all associated with this event, would 
preclude such a motion and preclude the requirement that the 
court attempt to "divine" what the recording showed. 
Here, the reasons given for the lack of preservation are 
believable, and amount to negligence but not in a high degree. 
The court finds no culpable conduct by anyone in the Department 
of Corrections. If the court believed that there was an 
intentional decision to record over this event, of course, the 
result would probably be different. 
Hansen cannot cause the recording to be preserved. The 
investigator, the court finds, asked the proper personnel to 
"make me a copy" of the event. It was not intentionally 
eliminated, or recorded over, the court finds, but it clearly 
should have been retained. The nameless person who was asked to 
make a recording perhaps, for any number of reasons, evidently 
failed to do so. The investigator, in the press of other 
business, failed to follow up in a timely way. That does not, in 
this court's view, favor defendant to the extent that the court 
should or could find a malicious motive or culpable conduct by 
the investigative team at Corrections. It was negligence, but 
negligence born of a multitude of factors and the fact that many 
personnel are involved in a setting such as a prison control 
unit. Just why a recording was not made, and who failed to make 
that recording, are not found as facts by the court, other than 
-12-
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it was institutional negligence. The investigator should have, 
respectfully, conducted her investigation in a way that retains 
relevant evidence. This recording was clearly relevant. The 
failure to do so, however, was at most negligence, and not gross 
negligence and certainly not intentional. 
So, while the court feels it need not examine the reasons 
for the lack of preservation, if the court is wrong about there 
being a reasonable probability about the exculpatory nature of 
the recording, the reasons for the loss of the evidence favor the 
State rather than dismissal of the charges. Defendant is still 
~ free to testify and bring witnesses to the trial, though of 
course she has not burden to do so. The State is free to present 
whatever relevant evidence it has. The actual participant, 
Hansen, has at this point presented credible evidence. Many, 
indeed almost all, assaultive incidents resulting in a trial are 
not recorded and the finder of fact is required to listen to the 
witnesses and determine what happened. The fact that this event 
happened to be recorded does not mean that the failure to retain 
that recording should result in a dismissal of the case. 
Defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to preserve 
evidence is DENIED. 
The matter is set for a status conference at 1:30 p.rn. on 
-13- 000138 
January 29, 2015, where a trial date will be scheduled. 
This Memorandum Decision is the Order of the court and no 
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14 Witness 1: 
15 Judge: 
16 




Uh Ms. Witt is this your case? 
Yes it is Your Honor. 
You may call your first witness. 
Uh the State would call Officer Hansen to the stand. 
Officer if you'll please approach. If you 1II come right up here please 
and raise your right hand. 
Swearing in of witness. 
I do. 
Sir if you'll be seated right at the witness stand. Once you're 
comfortably seated go ahead and pull your chair up. That 
microphones flexible so bend it however it's comfortable for you. If 
you'd please state your name and spell your last name for the 
record. 
Hansen, H-A-N-S-E-N. 
Thank you and if you wouldn't mind please state your first name as 
well. 
Ronald. 
Ronald, thank you Mr. Hansen. Counsel? 
DIRECT EXAMINATION OF OFFICER HANSEN 
Um Officer Hansen who are you currently employed with? 
21 Witness 1: The Department of Corrections for the State of Utah. 
22 ATP: And how long ... I'm sorry? 












1 ATP: And how long have you been employed with the uh Department of 
(.i) 2 Corrections? 
3 Witness 1: Uh since 2008, Feb ... February 5, 2008 till. .. 
4 ATP: And what are your duties as an officer with the Department of 
~ 5 Corrections? 
6 Witness 1: Uh safety and security of the institution. Protecting the in ... uh 
7 escorting inmates to and from different rec times and things like 
~ 
8 that. 
9 ATP: So where are you actually stationed or where's your work? 
~ 10 Witness 1: Right. .. right now I'm in mail and property. 
11 ATP: And in 2 ... in September of 2013 where were you working? 
12 Witness 1: I. .. I was ... I was posted in Timpanogas 3. 
~ 13 ·ATP: And Timpanogas 3 is where? 
14 Witness 1: It's uh the ... the fe ... female prison for the State of Utah. 
15 ATP: And is that in Salt Lake County? 
~ 
16 Witness 1: Yes it is. 
17 ATP: Okay. And um do you recall an incident that occurred in the prison 
~ 18 on September 27, 2013? 
19 Witness 1: Yes ... yes ma'am I do. 
20 ATP: Okay and could you explain what that incident was? 
~ 
21 Witness 1: Um I was taking 2 inmates back from the yard, they were out in the 
22 yard on rec and I was taking them back in to section 4. 
-..i) 23 ATP: And who were the 2 inmates? 
2 0000.56 
@ 
1 Witness 1: Uh Fatima Kahn and Samantha Dash. 
2 ATP: Okay. And you were taking them from the yard into ... 
@ 
3 Witness 1: From the yard in ... back inside the building. 
4 ATP: Okay. And where were you taking them to? 
5 Witness 1: Sec ... section 4. They were ... they ... that's where they were housed GD 
6 in section 4 on the top tier. 
7 ATP: Okay. And uh when you got to section 4 what were you going to do 
8 with Kahn and Dash? 
~ 
9 Witness 1: I was gonna have.• .. I was gonna lock them up to their cell doors 
10 and have their doors popped and put them back in their ... in their (;) 
11 cells cause their rec time was done. 
12 ATP: Now were Kahn and Dash, were they cell mates? 
13 Witness 1: No, no ma'am they ... they were not. ~ 
14 ATP: Okay. So what was the cell assignments at that time? 
15 Witness 1: Um Samantha Dash and uh was living in 415 and Kahn was in 416. 
~ 
16 ATP: And did they have cell mates? 
17 Witness 1: Yes, they did. 
18 ATP: Okay. So do you recall uh who Dash's cell mate was? G; 
19 Witness 1: Dash was living with De ... DeJesus at the time. 
20 ATP: And um DeJesus, uh she1s the Defendant in this case? 
21 Witness 1: Yes ma'am. 
22 ATP: Could you just point her out and identify her to the Court? 
































Record will reflect identification. 
Thank you Your Honor. Okay so at this time DeJesus was a ... a 
prisoner at uh the Board of ... or at the Department of Corrections? 
Witness 1: Yes ma'am. 
ATP: Okay. And so what cell was she in? 
Witness 1: She was in 4 ... 4 .. .415. 
ATP: 415. Okay so when you'ie tran ... when you're bringing her back to 
the tier I believe you called it. .. 
Witness 1: Uh-huh. 
ATP: uh what exactly occurred? 
Witness 1: Um I asked Kahn to go and stand in front of her ... her cell door and 
Samantha Dash and I were walking up ... we were walking up the 
stairs, I was behind them. Samantha Dash uh said Hansen check 
this out and kind of slowed down her pace of me getting up the 
stairs. Uh Kahn stood outside of DeJesus' cell ... Samantha Das h's 
and DeJesus' cell and leaned up against the ... the arm rail. 
ATP: And what happened at that point? 
Witness 1: When I got up to the cells I was ... they were talking through the 
door, they were kind of arguing. 
ATP: Who was talking ... arguing? 





1 Witness 1: And DeJesus had stated "are we really gonna do this in front of the 
2 cops". 
@ 
3 ATP: Okay. And then what happened? 
4 Witness 1: My ... my partner had opened the cell doors before I was ready for 
5 'em and DeJesus came out and swung at uh Kahn. © 
6 ATP: Okay. So De ... DeJesus came actually out, physically out of the 
7 cell? 
~ 
8 Witness 1: Out of her cell, yes. 
9 ATP: And started swinging at Kahn? 
10 Witness 1: Yes ma'am. ~ 
11 ATP: Uh did she make any contact with Kahn? 
12 Witness 1: Yes she did. 
13 ATP: And uh what did you do? ~ 
14 Witness 1: I. .. I pulled DeJesus off of Kahn and tried to put DeJesus back in 
15 her cell and close the door. 
Q 
16 ATP: And uh how did you do that? 
17 Witness 1: I picked her up and carried her there. 
18 ATP: Okay and did you put her back in the cell? 
" 
, 
19 Witness 1: Yes I did I just wasn't a ... able to secure the door. 
20 ATP: Okay. And when you weren't able to secure the door what 
21 happened? G:.i 
5 000059 
~ 
1 Witness 1: DeJesus came back out and they engaged again fighting and that's 
2 when I pushed DeJesus to the ... to the floor uh towards the 
~ 
3 showers of the top tier. 
4 ATP: Okay. So you pushed her to the floor, where was Kahn after you 
(.i) 5 pushed uh DeJesus to the floor? 
6 Witness 1: Kahn was ... was behind me a few feet. 
7 ATP: A few feet behind you? 
~ 
8 Witness 1: Yes ma'am. 
9 ATP: Okay and then what did you do at that point? 
~ 10 Witness 1: I. .. I closed the distance trying to ... I was gonna s ... secure 
11 De ... DeJesus and that's when she kicked me in my abdomen. 
12 ATP: Okay. So you were closing the distance between yourself and 
~ 13 DeJesus? 
14 Witness 1: Yes ma'am. 
15 ATP: And Kahn was a few feet behind you? 
v) 
16 Witness 1: Yes ma'am. 
17 ATP: Okay and when you approached DeJesus you said you got kicked 
~ 18 where? 
19 Witness 1: I got kicked in my lower ab ... abdomen and then once again in my 
20 uh right thigh. 
~ 
21 ATP: Okay. Now when this kicking occurred was there any kind of eye 
22 contact with the ... with DeJesus? 





1 ATP: 2 times? 
2 Witness 1: 2 times. 
@ 
3 ATP: And did you feel any pain from either of those kicks? 
4 Witness 1: The first one no, the one in my leg I did, yes. 
5 ATP: And uh was Kahn anywhere near that area? ~ 
6 Witness 1: No ma'am she wasn't. 
7 ATP: I have nothing further at this time. 
@ ' 
8 Judge: Thank you, Mr. Howard? 
9 CROSS EXAMINATION 
10 ATD: Officer Hansen this facility that. .. what did you call it, Timpanogas? Gi) 
11 Witness 1: Yes sir. 
12 ATD: Is that exclusive for female prisoners? 
13 Witness 1: Yes it is. ~ 
14 ATD: And is that a single level or multi-level (inaudible)? 
15 Witness 1: Uh there ... there's 2 tiers in the building. There's a bottom tier and 
Ci) 
16 a top tier. 
17 ATD: And cells 14 and 6 ... excuse me, 415 and 416 were on the upper 
18 tier? 
19 Witness 1 : Yes sir. 
20 ATD: So as you're approaching cells 415 and 416 you go up a set of 
21 stairs? 




1 ATD: When inmates Dash and Kahn were ... before you brought them into 
2 the section they had been where? Out. ... outside? ~ 
3 Witness 1: Yes, yes ... 
4 ATD: In a recreation area? 
~ 5 Witness 1: (inaudible) yeah, yes sir. 
6 ATD: And had you observed them while they were out there? 
7 Witness 1: Yeah they uh inmate and Kahn and Dash were talking out in the 
(i) 
8 bullpen and ... 
9 ATD: They were talking ... did you uh get any indication of hostility 
;;; 10 between either of the others ... either towards the other? 
11 Witness 1: No sir. 
12 ATD: These cells, 415 and 416 are they side by side? 
~ 13 Witness 1: Yes sir. 
14 ATD: And there's no intervening cell? 
15 Witness 1: No. 
v) 
16 ATD: How ... how close are the ... what's the distance between the two 
17 doors? 
~ 18 Witness 1: I believe on those two cells there's about 8-10 feet between those 
19 two doors. 
20 AT•: So you're over 6 foot? 
~ 
21 Witness 1: Yes sir. 
22 AT•: How tall are you? 
~ 23 Witness 1: I'm 6'1. 
8 
1 ATD: So you'd be easily able to lie down in the distance between those 
2 two doors? 
@ 
3 Witness 1: Yes. 
4 ATD: So when you were going up the stairs Dash and Kahn were what in 
5 front of you? @ 
6 Witness 1: The ... yes, they ... they were in front of me. 
7 ATD: Both of them? 
GI; 
8 Witness 1: Yes sir. 
9 ATD: And weie they shackled in any way? 
10 Witness 1: No sir. ~ 
11 ATD: So you ... you instructed Kahn, I believe you said, to stand in front of 
12 a cell? 
13 Witness 1: I wanted her to go stand in front of her door. @ 
14 ATD: Sorry now, say that again? 
15 Witness 1: I wanted her to stand in front of her cell door but she took up a post 
G) 
16 in front of DeJesus' door instead. 
17 ATD: And then you heard someone say "do we wanna do this in front of 
18 the cops"? G,, 
19 Witness 1: I heard De ... DeJesus say are we gonna do this in front of the cops. 
20 ATD: You're quite clear it was Ms. DeJesus? 
21 Witness 1: Yes sir. 
~ 
22 ATD: And Kahn did not move? She stayed in front of DeJesus' cell? 






1 ATD: Did you hear any other conversation between the 2 of them? 
2 Witness 1: They ... they were ar. .. arguing about something, I'm not. .. 
~ 
3 ATD: But you could tell that there was aggressive language between the 
4 2 of them? 
@ 5 Witness 1: (inaudible) yes. 
6 ATD: And Kahn wouldn't move down to her own cell? 
7 Witness 1: No. 
VB 
8 ATD: So at some point is ... are you up the stairs up onto the second tier 
9 when the doors are uh unlocked? 
~ 10 Witness 1: Yes sir I am. 
11 ATD: And is cell 415 close by the top of the stairs? 
12 Witness 1: Yes. 
~ 13 ATD: Like the next cell or? 
14 Witness 1: It is ... it's not directly at the top of the stairs it is off to the side. 
15 ATD: And the um so the off ... the other officer opened the door before 
~ 
16 you gave some kind of a signal? 
17 Witness 1: Yes from ... 
..i) 18 ATD: Is that in violate ... excuse me? 
19 Witness 1: from the yeah ... she ... she was in the control room. 
20 ATD: And uh is it in violation of normal protocol? Aren't you supposed to 
~ 
21 give some kind of a signal to open the doors? 




. 1 ATD: And so the door was opened and do you see inmate Kahn make 
2 any attempt to get into DeJesus' cell? 
GD 
3 Witness 1: No sir. 
4 ATD: But uh DeJesus came out? 
5 Witness 1: De ... yes 1 yes she did. (i) 
6 ATD: And they at that point engaged in some kind of mutual combat? 
7 Witness 1: Yes, they ... they were fighting. 
8 ATD: Fighting, throwing arms, fists? G 
9 Witness 1: Swinging, pulling hair, yes. 
10 ATD: Okay. And then you then grabbed DeJesus and physically moved Q 
11 her into her cell? 
12 Witness 1: Yes I did. 
13 ATD: Is that in keeping with standard protocol for you to have physical Gi) 
14 contact? 
15 Witness 1: I ... I was trying to ... I was trying to control the situation sir. 
G;J 
16 ATD: What. .. what does the ... what does the protocol. .. the standard 
17 operating procedure call for? 
18 Witness 1: Isolate and contain the ... the incident. (;) . 
19 ATD: And by isolate does that mean physically get involved or ... 
20 Witness 1: Some ... sometimes, yes. 
21 ATD: does it call for at times using perhaps mace? Q 
22 Witness 1: Uh-huh. 




1 Witness 1: Yes sir ... yes sir I do. 
2 ATD: You don't carry any firearm inside the prison? 
~ 
3 Witness 1: No sir, we don't. 
4 ATD: Do you have ... carry a like a nightstick, a billy club? 
(ii) 5 Witness 1: No just uh just uh OC spray. 
6 ATD: Okay. But you didn't take that out at that time? 
7 Witness 1: No I didn't. 
~ 
8 ATD: And you pushed Ms. DeJesus back into cell 415? 
9 Witness 1: Uh 416, she was living in 416. 
ViJ 10 ATD: Oh excuse me, I got that. .. so DeJesus, that was her assigned cell, 
11 416? 
12 Witness 1: Yes sir. 
@ 13 ATD: And Dash was assigned to 416 as well? 
14 Witness 1: Yes, they were cell mates. 
15 ATD: And then Kahn was in 415? 
~ 
16 Witness 1: Yes sir. 
17 ATD: So as you go to ... get to the top of the stairs and approach down the 
~ 18 uh like there's a catwalk of some kind? 
19 Witness 1: Yes sir. 
20 ATD: Which cell is the next one at the top after you leave the top of the 
~ 
21 stairs, 15 or 16? 
22 Witness 1: 16 is at the top of the ... top of the stairs just to the right. 17 and 18 




1 ATD: So Kahn actually passed her cell and went down to ... or excuse me, 
2 yes ... 
@ 
3 Witness 1: She pa ... she should've passed DeJesus' cell and gone and stood 
4 in front of her cell. 
5 ATD: She should have? ~ 
6 Witness 1: That. .. she should have, yes. 
7 ATD: Okay. So 15 is beyond 16? 
8 Witness 1: Yes. 
G) 
9 ATD: Was the cell door to 416 opened at the same time as 415? 
10 Witness 1: Yes sir it was. G 
11 ATD: So they ... 
12 Witness 1: (inaudible) ... 
13 ATD: simultaneously? Gi) 
14 Witness 1: at the time they ... they ... DeJesus, Kahn and Samantha Dash and 
15 the other cell ... the 4 of them, they were all living together. I don't 
~ 
16 recall who was living with Kahn at the time. They're all the same 
17 level so that they can recreate at the same time, they can be out at 
18 the same time so we can open multiple doors at the same time to (;.i 
19 let them in and out because they are of the same ... the same levels. 
20 So it is customary to open the doors of all the ... all the level. .. all 
21 the ... like the A levels ... not the A levels, but the B levels and C w 
22 levels and D levels can all come out at the same time. So they 




1 were open at the same time so that they could go back into their 
2 house. 
~ 
3 ATD: Okay just to make sure I understand. Cells 416 and 415 are on the 
4 same level? 
~ 5 Witness 1: They're on the same tier and then the ... 
6 ATD: And ... 
7 Witness 1: inmates have the same classification level. 
~ ' 
8 ATD: and I'll just interrupt you for a second. Is every cell on that tier the 
9 same privilege level as you ... 
va 10 Witness 1: Not necessarily. 
11 ATD: not necessarily. So there's the capability to open 1 door at a time 
12 rather than ... 
~ 13 Witness 1: Yes sir. 
14 ATD: the whole set? Or the whole set can be opened at once? 
15 Witness 1: Yes sir. 
v;) 
16 ATD: You've been in the control room? 
17 Witness 1: Yes sir. 
(ii 18 ATD: You know how it works? 
19 Witness 1: Uh-huh, yes sir. 
20 ATD: There's ... is there a button there for each cell door? 
~ 
21 Witness 1: Yes sir there is. 
22 ATD: And is there a button to open all doors at once? 






But in ... in this case, as far as you know, 15 .. .415 and 416 were 
opened at the same time? 
3 Witness 1 : Yes sir. 
4 ATD: And when uh 415, which is, if I understand correctly w_as Kahn's 
5 cell door was opened, she didn't go down to that? 
6 Witness 1: No, she did not. 
7 ATD: Okay. She ... she uh essentially waited for DeJesus to come out of 
8 




13 Witness 1: 
14 ATD: 
15 Witness 1: 
16 
17 ATD: 
18 Witness 1: 
19 ATD: 




Then they engage in this mutual combat. You got engaged and 
you separated them physically and you put Ms. DeJesus back in 
her cell, 416? 
Yes sir. 
But your ... the control officer ... 
I was not able to close the door because she rushed the door to 
come back out and continue fighting. 
So can you manually close the door from ... 
Yes. 
And lock it? 
Yes. Once the ... once the door. .. door is closed its ... its locked. 
So she wouldn't allow you to close the door, she ... 
22 Witness 1: She would not allow me to close the door. 








1 Witness 1: She pushed past me, she didn't slip pass she (inaudible). 
Go 2 ATD: So at that time, you're on this cat walk uh 415 is to your right as 
3 you're facing DeJesus cell? 
4 Witness 1: Yes. 
~ 5 ATD: And then you're right in front of 416? 
6 Witness 1: Yes sir. 
7 ATD: So Kahn is to your right as well? 
VI 
8 Witness 1: Yes she's down ... she's just down ... down the stair behind me. 
9 ATD: And DeJesus came in out of 416 and she tried to get past you 
vo 10 down ... back down to Kahn? 
11 Witness 1: Back down to re-engage with Kahn. 
12 ATD: But you're indicating that she didn't get down to Kahn again? 
~ 13 Witness 1: No I was ... the second ... when she came out of the cell that was 
14 when I pushed her to the left and ... 
15 ATD: Kay so how far ... but Kahn was immediately to your right? She 
,J 
16 didn't go down to her cell? 
17 Witness 1: Kahn ... she was on my back, I don't know exactly where she was. 
~ 18 She was ... she was not. .. she was no longer on my shoulder 
19 though, I could not see her behind me, she was behind me. 
20 ATD: Okay. So she could've been as close as inches away but you 
v;J 
21 couldn't see her? 





1 ATD: And then at some point you say that Ms. DeJesus kicked in your 
2 direction? 
G;} 
3 Witness 1: She kicked me sir. 
4 ATD: And hit you in the stomach? 
5 Witness 1: Yes. @ 
6 ATD: And then she kicked a second time and hit you in the? 
7 Witness 1: Hit me in the ... in the upper right thigh. 
8 ATD: Okay. 
Q 
9 Witness 1: To ... towards my ... my groin. 
10 ATD: And you couldn't tell because your back was to Kahn, you couldn't GJ 
11 tell if she was immediately there or not? 
12 Witness 1: No but DeJesus looked me right. .. right in the eye before she kicked 
13 me the first time, she knew where she was kicking. G) 
14 ATD: Kay. Now this is a highly secured facility? 
15 Witness 1: Yes sir. 
GJ 
16 ATD: Timpanogas ... I don't know what the category of security is, if it's 
17 maximum or minimum, what. .. how would you ... 
18 Witness 1: Timp ... Timpanogas 3 is the maximum sec ... security unit. ~ 
19 ATD: Maximum secure unit for females? 
20 Witness 1: Yes sir. 
21 ATD: And so there must be video surveillance all around the place? 




1 ATD: And there is a video camera that would be pointing directly in this 
2 area towards 4 ... cell 416? 
@ 
3 Witness 1: Yes sir there is. 
4 ATD: Now do you know anything about that video that. .. there should be 
~ 5 a video then of that activity? 
6 Witness 1: There ... there is a video but I am not authorized to ... to uh to record 
7 the ... record the information off of that, that is above me. 
VJ 
8 ATD: Kay so you have no knowledge that the video equipment was 
9 turned off or was not working? 
"' 
10 Witness 1: The video e ... equipment was working because I reviewed the fight 
11 afterwards. 
12 ATD: You reviewed the video? 
vJ) 13 Witness 1: Yes I did. 
14 ATD: Okay. So you saw the video ... 
15 Witness 1: Afterwards, yes. 
,J 
16 ATD: but. .. but you had no authority to record it yourself? 
17 Witness 1: No sir. 
~ 18 ATD: So who would be immediately in charge of retaining that. .. that 
19 video? 
20 Witness 1: All ... all the recordings have to come through the investigations 
.;;; 
21 have to order it and then they send (inaudible) they send uh BIT 
22 who is our. .. our IT department in to rip the recording. 
~ 23 ATD: So there's not 1 person it's just an investigations department. .. 
18 000072 
@ 
1 Witness 1: Department. .. 
2 ATD: or division? 
G;) 
3 Witness 1: Yes, sir. 
4 ATD: How soon after this incident did you view that video? 
5 Witness 1: It was about 15 minutes afterwards. Ci} 
6 ATD: Kay, thank you. 
7 Judge: Any follow up Ms. Witt? 
Q 
8 ATP: Just one clarification. 
9 Judge: Sure. 
10 RE-DIRECT OF OFFICER HANSEN Q 
11 ATP: When you said you watched the video 15 ... about 15 minutes later 
12 was it a ... like a separate video or did you just watch a playback? 
13 Witness 1: We just watched a ... a playback. G) 
14 ATP: Okay. I have nothing further Your Honor. 
15 Judge: Alright, very good. Mr. Hansen thank you very much, you may step 
(.y 
16 down. 
17 Witness 1: Thank you. 
18 Judge: Any other witnesses today Ms. Witt? ~ 
19 ATP: Uh no Your Honor the State rests. 
20 Judge: Mr. Howard do you plan on calling witnesses? 
21 ATD: Your Honor we don't have any witnesses today. I've advised Ms. Q 
22 DeJesus of her right to present evidence today and advised against 





1 Judge: Is that true Ms. DeJesus? 
2 Def: Yes sir. (&) 
3 Judge: Alright, very good. Uh any argument Ms. Witt? 
4 ATP: Uh no Your Honor the State would submit. 
;jJ; 5 Judge: Mr. Howard? 
6 ATD: No argument. 
7 Judge: Alright. I find that there 1s probable cause to believe the crimes 
vj) 
8 were committed and further that Ms. DeJesus committed the crime, 
9 I'm therefore binding the case over to Judge Lubeck. Uh would you 
viJ 10 want to have 2 or 4 weeks Mr. Howard? 
11 ATD: I think we need 4 weeks Your Honor ... 
12 Judge: Okay. 
~ 13 ATD: to see if we can locate this video. 
14 Judge: Alright. Let's set it for the 14th of July then at 8:30 in the morning 
15 for a felony ... actually at 1 :30 in the afternoon for a felony pretrial 
...J 
16 conference in front of Judge Lubeck. Alright, thank you. 
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WEST JORDAN, UTAH - DECEMBER 2, 2014 
JUDGE BRUCE LUBECK 
(Transcriber's note: Identification of speakers 
may not be accurate with audio recordings.) 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
MR. HOWARD: We're ready on the Dejesus matter, Your 
THE COURT: The State vs. Dejesus, 141400093. 
here with Mr. Howard. This is the time set for an 
evidentiary hearing. 
She's 
So, Ms. Witt, you have a witness? Some witnesses? 
What -
MS. WITT: Your Honor, the State's going to recall 
Officer Hansen to the stand. He is someone who did watch the 
video. It wasn't a video - watched the playback after it 
occurred. 
THE COURT: Well, let's see. Just a sec. Okay. 
Well, yeah. Go ahead and call him, and we'll -
Officer, step up here, and raise your right hand, 
and take an oath, please? Just anywhere there, raise your 
right hand, and ... 
RONALD HANSEN 
Having first been duly sworn, testified 
upon his oath as follows: 



























your name and spell your name after you get comfortable and 
fairly close to that microphone, please? 
THE WITNESS: Ronald Hansen, H-A-N-S-E-N. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
Ms. Witt? 
MS. WITT: Thank you. 
DTRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MS. WITT: 
Q Do you recall testifying in this matter on June 
17th Of 2014? 
A Yes, ma'am, I do. 
Q I just want to do some clarifying questions 
regarding the playback of the events that occurred that day. 
You stated, when you testified, that you did have an 
opportunity to view the playback of what occurred? 
A Yes , ma ' am . 
Q And do you recall how far after - how long after 
the event that occurred? 
A It was about 30 minutes. 
Q And when you watched the playback, what did you 
observe? 
A I saw the altercation, and I saw Dejesus corning -
you know, I saw what happened. And then after I pushed 
Dejesus to the ground and went to engage to subdue her, 



























Q So do you recall seeing where Con was at the point 
that you pushed the defendant onto the ground? 
A During the incident or on the playback? 
Q 
A 
On the playback. 
On the playback, she was a few feet - between four 




Behind you when you pushed the defendant to the 
Yes. 
Q And it was after you pushed the defendant to the 





And I believe you testified it was two times? 
Yes, ma'am, twice. 
Q So when you say Con was about four to six feet 
behind you, what was she doing? 
A 
Q 
She was disengaged. She was just backing off. 
So she wasn't at - by disengaging, do you mean she 




And as far as the playback, was there, to your 
knowledge, ever a video made of this incident? 
A To my knowledge, no. 
Q 
A 




























Q Okay. And that's how - you just rewinded it, and 
then played it back? 
A Yes, ma'am. 
MS. WITT: I have nothing further, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Howard? 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MR. HOWARD: 
Q So Officer Hansen, you recall we were here for a 
preliminary hearing back in June of this year? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q And I got to ask you some questions. Do you recall 
that - that at one point, I said so how far - that Con was 
immediately -
This is on page 16 of the preliminary hearing. 
MS. WITT: Thank you. 
MR. HOWARD: On line 15. 
Q (BY MR. HOWARD) - was immediately to your right? 
She didn't go down to her cell? Your answer, neon? She was 
on my back. I don't know exactly where she was. She was -
she was not. She was no longer on my shoulder, though. 
could not see her behind me. She was behind me." And I 
I 
asked, uso she could have been as close as inches away from 
you, but you couldn't see her?" And your answer, uBut I 
could not see her, no." So at the time of the preliminary 
































saying that the video feedback that you saw immediately after 
the incident, that you are now remembering a month - a year 
and a half later, you are recalling now that Con was several 
feet behind you? 
A During the incident, I did not know where she was. 
I was asked about, after viewing the playback, where Con was. 
Q Let me read your response. ushe was on my back. I 
don't know exactly where she was." So the time at the 
preliminary hearing, you didn't know exactly where she was? 
A Let me clarify. During the incident that was going 
on, which I believe is what you were referring to in your 
question, was I did not know where Con was while the incident 
was occurring - while we were engaged. 
Q So are you indicating that you did not say that at 




No. I'm not saying I didn't say that, no. 
Okay. And so your position now is that these two 
had been fighting and engaging with each other, you pushed or 
forced Dejesus to the ground, and Con disengaged and floated 
backwards, and had no violent action whatsoever? She just -
with your back turned to her, she suddenly became submissive? 
A After I'd moved - after I had pushed Dejesus to the 
ground, I did not feel Con on my back anymore. 



























MS. WITT: Just clarifying -
THE COURT: Sure. 
MS. WITT: - Your Honor. 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MS. WITT: 
Q Now, you did testify at the preliminary hearing 
that that is correct, that you did testify that. But earlier 
in your testimony -
And I'm referring to page six of the preliminary 
hearing. 
You were actually asked specifically where Con was 






And what was your response to that? 
A few feet behind me. 
Okay. So when you're saying - when you tried to 
explain that what you were testifying as far as on my back, 
just behind me, that's your recollection as the events were 
occurring? You didn't know where she was? 
A While the events were occurring, I did not know 
where she was. 
you? 
Q But you did learn that she was a few feet behind 
A 
Q 
Yes, I did. 



























------·--·--·----------·-·· ....... ·-··· ··• ··- ............ . 
preliminary hearing; isn't that correct? 
A Yes, ma'am. 
MS. WITT: I have nothing further, Your Honor. 
RE-CROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MR. HOWARD: 
Q I don't know how much you want to belabor this, 
Officer. You were accurate in saying that you didn't know 




And when you were asked that question at the 
preliminary hearing and you said I don't know where she was, 






I didn't know where she was during -
- is what you -
- the incident? 
So you misspoke? 
Yes. 
THE COURT: And I have a couple of questions, and 
obviously counsel can followup on. I just want to clarify 
some things. So Officer Hansen, tell me how this - whatever 
you viewed. I don't know what word to use. You said it is 
not preserved, but you could watch it. What is it that you 
watched? 
THE WITNESS: It's a digital recording system that 



























where the video is stored on a hard drive, and it's 
continually rewritten. 
THE COURT: And so how do you view it, if you wanted 
to look at it as you say you did, 30 minutes later, or 12 
days later, or something? You do it by time and date? 
THE WITNESS: Time and date, yes. 
THE COURT: And then you are able to watch it on a 
screen of some sorts? ~ 
THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: And how is that made a permanent record 
if you wanted to do that? 
THE WITNESS: Our investigations department has to 
request a copy be burned to a DVD. 
THE COURT: So when this event occurred, I take it 
you're required to report to some kind of supervisor? 
THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: And did you do that shortly after the 
event, or within a day or two, or something? 
THE WITNESS: With - that day, my supervisor knew 
what was going on. 
THE COURT: And do you fill out an incident report, 
or what kind of report are you required to fill out? 
THE WITNESS: I wrote a report about the incident. 
THE COURT: And you give it to -
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THE COURT: And then from there in the system within 
the Department of Corrections, do you know - is that then, as 
a matter of course, turned over to someone you call the 
investigations unit? 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
THE COURT: Or do you know that? 
THE WITNESS: Depending on the - on what's going on 
in the report and if you're charging them with something, 
then it would get turned over to investigations. 
THE COURT: Did - you did - you don't turn it over 
to investigations? 
THE WITNESS: No. My supervisor does. 
THE COURT: And who is that? 
THE WITNESS: Captain Redding. 
THE COURT: Captain Redding? 
THE WITNESS: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
THE COURT: And do you have any personal knowledge 
in this case if Captain Redding turned this over to 
investigations? 
THE WITNESS: Yes, she did. The investigations came 
and talked to me that aft - up about an hour and a half after 
the incident. 
THE COURT: So that same day, September 27? The 
same day of the incident, September 27 of last year? 




























THE COURT: Okay. And who was that? 
THE WITNESS: I don't recall her name. ~ 
THE COURT: Do you know who the initial D, as in 
David, Kemp is? 
I ... 
THE WITNESS: I'm sorry. What? 
THE COURT: Kemp, K-E-M-P? 
THE WITNESS: I believe that was the investigator. 
THE COURT: And so if - tell me again who could ask 
for a burned DVD from this digital recording? Could you 
have? 
THE WITNESS: No, sir. 
THE COURT: And could your supervisor have asked for 
that? 
THE WITNESS: My captain could ask for it, or the 
Investigations Department could ask. 
THE COURT: And who do they ask? 
THE WITNESS: They would request that through our IT 
Department -
THE COURT: Okay. 
THE WITNESS: - and they would send somebody into 
pull it from the DVR. 
THE COURT: Would your supervisor, and captain, and 
- they would know of this digital recording equipment, and 
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THE WITNESS: They're in the control room so that we 
have access to watch a playback, if we need to. 
THE COURT: All right. Any followup on any of that? 
Ms. Witt? 
MS. WITT: No, Your Honor. I think we discussed 
this at the last preliminary hearing. 
THE COURT: Mr. Howard? 
MR. HOWARD: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Officer Hansen. 
You may step down. 
Any other testimony to present, Ms. Witt? 
MS. WITT: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Howard, any testimony you care to 
present? 
MR. HOWARD: Your Honor, did the Court receive our 
supplementary memorandum in this matter? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. HOWARD: I sent it in last week. 
THE COURT: Filed - yeah. 
MR. HOWARD: It's our position that the Court 
already has sufficient information to rule in favor of the 
defendant in this case. The showing that is required is not 
de minimus, but it is very near to that. We have shown that 
a recording did exist. We've shown that the investigation -
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I 
evidence, and that evidence would very likely be exculpable 
for Ms. Dejesus. The only person who has - who saw the video 
that we know of today that has - or claims to have a clear 
memory of what was in the video is Officer Hansen, and, of 
course, he's an involved party. So we do not believe any 
further evidence is provided by the defendant. However, in 
deference to the Court in order to provide more information 
to the Court, we do have two witnesses that we will call. 
THE COURT: Well, now let me make it clear. I don't 
suggest you have to. If you have something you want me to 
hear, I'll be glad to hear it. If you don't, I'm not 
suggesting you need to call - I don't know if you do or don't 
need to call anything. I haven't made up my mind yet. So I 
14 , certainly don't know, but if you - if there's some facts you 
15 think I - that might assist me, I'll be glad to hear them. 










THE COURT: And - but, you know, -
MR. HOWARD: Obviously, I know that the Court can't 
order me to put on a witness. 
THE COURT: Right. 
MR. HOWARD: So I'm aware of that, but I think that 
we have, so far, in our earlier discussions and earlier 
hearing, the Court's indicated that the Court does not 
believe that there's sufficient information to act positively 
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i 
present at the time, and we'll call first Samantha Dash. 
THE COURT: Why don't you step up here in front of 
my assistant? You can halt right there, face her, raise your 
right hand as best you can, and take an oath, please? 
SAMANTHA DASH 
Having first been duly sworn, testified 
upon her oath as follows: 
THE COURT: Have a seat over here. 
MS. WITT: And, Your Honor, before Mr. Howard 
proceeds, the State would request that the Court give a right 
against incrimination warning to Ms. Dash. She was 
originally charged in this case, and then those - that charge 
was dismissed without prejudice. So based on her testimony 
today, we could refile that case, and so I think she needs to 
be aware of her rights. 
THE COURT: Well, I don't know that I could say 
anymore than you just did, Ms. Witt. I will - I certainly 
wasn't aware of that. I hadn't look - researched that. So 
she was charged, it was dismissed, there was - she did not 
have a preliminary hearing or ... 
MS. WITT: That's correct. She did not have a 
preliminary hearing. It was dismissed without prejudice. We 
had some issues with the witnesses, but if she's testifying 
today, there is a chance that we would file additional 
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· THE COURT: Well, Ms. Dash, again I have no 
indication of whether the State will or won't. It's totally 
their decision, but you - I guess, you need to understand 
that if you say something that is contrary to your interest, 
it's going to be under oath, it's on the record, and the 
State could utilize that if they decide to file charges 
again. You understand that? 
MS. DASH: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Okay. All right. Go - tell us your 
name, and lean forward, if you would. 
Officer, if you could pull that microphone down by 
her just to make sure it records well. 
Tell us your name and spell your name? 
MS. DASH: Samantha Dash, S-A-M-A-N-T-H-A D-A7S-H. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
Mr. Howard? 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. HOWARD: 
Q Samantha, you're a prisoner at the Utah State 
Prison; is that correct? 
A Yes. 
Q And we're here today to discuss and investigate an 
incident that occurred in September of 2013 involving Ms. 
Dejesus and another inmate with the last name Con. Do you 





























A I don't want to say nothing. 
Q Excuse me? 
A I don't want to say nothing. I don't want to 
incriminate myself. 
MR. HOWARD: Very well, thank you. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
MR. HOWARD: Your Honor? 
THE COURT: You may step down. Thank you. 
MR. HOWARD: Your Honor, we'll call Sarah Ataata, 
please? 
THE COURT: And, lady, just come up here in front of 
this other young lady. Do the best you can. Right over 
here. Raise your right hand as best you can and take an 
oath, please? 
SARAH ATAATA 
Having first been duly sworn, testified 
upon her oath as follows: 
THE COURT: Thank you. Come around there and have a 
seat, please? 
MS. WITT: And, Your Honor, we would ask for the 
same admonition be given to this witness. I - she's not in 
any of our reports. I have no idea what her testimony is 
going to be, or how she is even involved with this case, and 
she was not involved in the move. So we would ask the Court 
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does self incriminate herself, charges could be filed. 
THE COURT: All right. First, tell me your name and 
spell you name, please? 
MS. ATAATA: Sarah Ataata. S-A-R-A-H, and my last 
name's A-T-A-A-T-A. 
THE COURT: Say it again? H-E ... 
MR. HOWARD: A-T-A -
THE COURT: Oh, your last name? 
MS. ATAATA: A-T-A-A-T-A. 
THE COURT: Can you say it again? 
MS. ATAATA: Ataata. 
THE COURT: Ataata? 
MS. ATAATA: Yes. 
THE COURT: All right. Ms. Ataata, I have no idea 
what you're going to talk about, but the State seems to think 
that potentially you could be the subject of some criminal 
charge. You have a right not to incriminate yourself. That 
is to say something that could cause you to be exposed to 
criminal liability. I have no idea that you will or won't do 
that. They just suggested that's a possibility. You 
understand· that. You don't have to say anything that could be 
against you, in essence. Do you understand that? 
MS. ATAATA: Yes. 






























BY MR. HOWARD: 
Q Sarah, you are a prisoner at the Utah State Prison? 
A Yes. 
Q And you were present September 27 th , 2013 when an 
incident took place between Lissette Dejesus and Inmate Con? 
A Yes. 
Q Now, I'm not interested in how that incident began 
or how the confrontation between those two inmates occurred 
or how it proceeded except up to the point where Officer 
Hansen, who had escorted some inmates to the level at which 
this occurred, forced Ms. Dejesus to the ground. Were you at 
- were you - did you have a vantage point where you were able 
to observe that occurrence? 
A 
Q 
For the most of it, yes. 
Did you see the - do you recall a point at which 
Ms. Dejesus was -
MS. WITT: Objection, Your Honor, leading. 
THE COURT: Overruled. 
Q (BY MR. HOWARD) Do you recall a point at which Ms. 






And what was - where was Officer Hansen at that 
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Yes. And what happened thereafter? 
Con - do you guys want me to use -
Let me -
- last names or -
Let me guide you a little bit. Was there a point 
at which officer - or Con disengaged and stood back from 




Was she continually on - behind Officer Hansen to 
the side, in front of - can you describe that? 
A As Officer Hansen was trying to escort Dejesus back 





Q Con? And did you see Officer Hansen get Dejesus 
into her cell? 
A She - yeah. I seen her attempt to. 
Q Excuse me? 
A I seen him attempt to. 
Q Attempt to? 
A Yes. 
Q Was it after that point that they went to the 
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A 
Q 
No. It was before that they were on the ground. 
Okay. And was there any time when Dejesus was on 
the ground and Hansen was there with her - was there any time 
when Con backed away several feet? 
A No. 
Q You're indication is she was right there on his 
















At over him to get to Dejesus. 
To try to get to Dejesus? 
Yeah. 
MR. HOWARD: Okay, thank you. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
Ms. Witt? 
CROSS EXAMINATION 





So you said you had a vantage point? Where were 
I was in room 417. 









































On the top tier. 
Okay. So it's on the top tier. So you were in 
Yes. 




So what cell is next to you? 
Sixteen. 
And then what cell is past that? 
Fifteen. 
Okay. And you said that you had - not for the 






And so what was your vantage point? 
Like the incidents that occurred during that time 
or just what I could see? 
Q 
A 
What you could see? 
You could see up to the tier where - I don't know 
how to describe it. It kind of - like if this were the tier 
- this block right here, my room was right here. You could 



























Q So that's how you are saying that you could see 
this? 
A Yes. 
Q And so you watched the entire thing occur? 
A The only part I didn't see was when Hansen forced 
Dejesus against the wall to bring her back to her cell. 
So was this the only encounter you've seen between 
Hansen - or between - with the defendant? 
A What do you - I don't understand what you're 
saying. 
Q Has the defendant been engaged in other incidents 
in which Officer Hansen or another officer had to restrain 
her? 
MR. HOWARD: Objection, Your Honor. I believe 
that's beyond the scope of this hearing. 
Q 
THE COURT: Overruled. 
THE WITNESS: No. 
(BY MS. WITT) So you've never seen any other 







Okay. And how long have you been in that cell? 
In 417? 
Uh-huh (affirmative). 
During that time, I'd say about a month. We move 




























So what day did you get there? 
In that cell? 
Uh-huh (affirmative). 







A I don't know. I just remember it was cold outside. 
So I would say sometime around fall or winter. Maybe going 
into the first of the year. 
Going into the first of what year? Q 
A Last year - this year. I don't know. I've been in 
that cell twice. 
Q Okay. So what about this incident, that you recall 
this specific incident on this specific day? 
A Yeah. I remember the actions that took place. I 
don't remember exact dates. 
Q So you don't remember if this was the same date? 
You be - but you don't know? 
A I'm pretty sure I understand what I see when I see 
it. 
Q But you just said you don't - you're not sure if 





I don't know exact dates. 
But you say that you saw this? 
Yeah. 


































No. We move quite often in that building. 
Who was your roommate or your cell mate? 
Her name is - what's Frog's name? Her nickname's 
You don't recall her name? 
Not a~ ~nis time. 






So they're - you see them from behind? 
Well, I see them from the side. Like if I were 
looking like that. 
So which direction are they going? 
They moved that way. 








They started in front of 417? 
Well, it was 416. It was right next door. 
doors are adjacent. 
Q And which direction were they going? 
A To the left. 
Q 
A 
Which is to which - towards which cell? 
































So they started in front of 416? 
Yes. 
Where did they come from? 
A Con was already on the tier, and Dejesus came out 
of the cell. 









How was she on the tier? 
She was out on rec. 
I don't understand what that means? 
Recreation. When you come out -
She was on recreation? 
Yes. 
So she was just hanging out there? Q 
A They were bringing them in from the yard, which at 










Okay. So there was rec outside? 
Uh-huh (affirmative). 
And then she was~ but she was in front of 416? 
Yes. 
Okay. And she was by herself at that time? 
No. She was with Officer Hansen at that time. 
Okay. And where did they come from? 
Outside. 


































They stood in front of 416. 
And it was just Hansen and -
Con. 
- and Con? Those were the only two that were 
Yeah. 
MS. WITT: I have nothing further, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
Mr. Howard, any redirect? 
MR. HOWARD: [inaudible]. 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. HOWARD: 
Q Ms. Ataata, do you recall who - at that time, who 
the roommate was for Ms. Dejesus? 
A Yeah. It was Samantha Dash. 
Q And where was she at during this? 
A In the room. 
Q In the - or in her cell? 
A In her cell, yeah. 
THE COURT: Anything else? 
MR. HOWARD: No. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MS. WITT: And just to clarify -
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RE-CROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MS. WITT: 
Q Ms. Dash was in her cell the entire time? 
A She came in from rec and was in her cell. 
Q So she was -
A Are you talking about during the fight? 
Q Yeah. 
A Yeah, she was in her cell. 
MS. WITT: Okay, thank you. 
THE COURT: All right. You may step down. Thank 
you. 
THE WITNESS: Uh-huh {affirmative). 
MS. WITT: Oh, Your Honor, can we recall her for 
just a moment? I'm sorry. We weren't aware that she was 
going to testify. So I apologize. 
THE COURT: Come on back, if you would then? All 
right. You're still under oath. 
Go ahead, Ms. Witt. 
RE-CROSS EXAMINATION (resumed) 
BY MS. WITT: 
Q And just really quick, what is your relationship 
with the defendant? 







































THE COURT: Mr. Howard? 
MR. HOWARD: Nothing, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right, thank you. You may step 
down. 
Mr. Howard, any further testimony you care to 
present? 
MR. HOWARD: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Ms. Witt, any further testimony from the 
State? 
MS. WITT: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. Well, I'll be glad to hear 
arguments. I'm going to have to take this under advisement, 
and I'll probably issue a written ruling, but - and think 
about further, but I'll be glad to hear any argument - any 
further argument, Mr. Howard. Again, you're right. I've got 
your memos. I've read them. I'll read them again, but 
anything else you want to say, go ahead, and then I'll hear 
from the State. 
MR. HOWARD: Well, just briefly, Your Honor. Some 
of the facts are fairly well established. An incident took 
place. There was a struggle of - a fight, if you will, 
between Ms. Dejesus and Ms. Con. Officer Hansen intervened. 
He claims he was kicked. And for the purposes of this 



























the preliminary hearing was mixed. He said at one time that 
he - she was five to six feet behind him, but he admitted on 
cross examination he didn't know where she was. Now, he 
wants to change that testimony to mean "I didn't know where 
she was at that time." But we were talking about at the time 
of the preliminary hearing, she said - he said, I don't know 
i•Jhere she was. 
The only other officers who have - that I know of 
that viewed the recording don't have a clear recollection of 
the incident that's well over a year ago now. It doesn't 
perhaps stick out in their mind as well as it might of those 
that were closely involved in it. 
Ms. Dash, of course, was wise enough to pick up on 
a no subtle threat today that she might could possibly be 
prosecuted if she were to testify, and Ms. Ataata did 
testify. She indicated that at that time that Ms. Dejesus 
was on the ground and Hansen was there with her, that inmate 
Con was right there the whole time swinging at Dejesus. 
We believe, Your Honor, that that having been 
caught on video recording would have been sufficient to 
present to a jury and leave to their decision, of course, but 
we believe it would have shown that Ms. Dejesus was in the 
proces.s of trying to protect herself from the continued 
attack of Ms. Con. It is, from our point of view, an 
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incident an investigator spoke to Officer Hansen, and the 
State failed in their responsibility to preserve that 
evidence. We're not arguing here as to whether it was 
maliciously destroyed, or as a matter of routine, ·err a lapse 
of judgment, or mere incompetence. All we know is that the 
State had possession of the evidence, and they are required 
to preserve it. And, therefore, since they didn't preserve 
it, the Court should dismiss this case against Ms. Dejesus. 
I might - if I -
THE COURT: Sure. 
MR. HOWARD: I might just add one thing, Your Honor. 
This kind of situation presents a horrifying precedent 
wherein the State can - through negligence allow evidence to 
be dismissed, but also provides an avenue - and I'm not 
saying that's what's happened here. It provides an avenue by 
which they can destroy evidence which is favorable to the 









cause he was there at the scene. He's involve - he was 
involved in the incident, and he has already said, at least 
at one point, I don't know where Con was. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
Ms. Witt? 
MS. WITT: Yes, Your Honor. The State received the 
defense counsel's supplemental filing yesterday afternoon. 
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right before Thanksgiving. So we -
THE COURT: Yes. @ 
MS. WITT: - didn't receive it -
THE COURT: Yeah. 
MS. WITT: - late in the afternoon. So I didn't 
have the time - that much time to look over it. However, 
Your Honor, we have heard the testimony of Officer Hansen, 
who.was present at the time. If you look at the preliminary 
hearing transcript, his testimony is clear. On page 3 he was 
asked, "How far away - when you pushed her to the floor, 
where was Con after you pushed Dejesus to the floor?" And he 
testified Con was behind me a few feet, and I clarified that. 
"A few feet behind you?" And he said, "Yes, ma' am." 
Now, I think he was trying to characterize, and I 
think he did a very good job of characterizing the testimony 
that Mr. Howard has been referring to as far as being - her 
being on the back. At the time of the testimony if Your 
Honor looks to those pages within the preliminary hearing, 
you'll see that defense counsel specifically asking questions 
about what he's observing as this event is occurring, and 
that's what.Officer Hansen testified to today. That he was -
he was answering the question, because all the questions, if 
you look at the transcript, that defense counsel was posing 
at that time had to do with his observations at the time it 






























officer wasn't combining, you know, what he learned later 
with what was occurring at that time. So I don't think 
there's any change in his testimony. Like I said, page 60 he 
actually stated she was a few feet behind. 
Today, Mr. - Officer Hansen testified that he did 
view the playback on the DVR. That when he viewed the 
playback, he could see how far she was behind him, and 
that's, I believe, what led to his testimony on page six that 
she was a few feet behind. He had the opportunity to view 
that playback. Mr. Howard has subpoenaed the other officer. 
They appeared today. One of the officers appeared today. He 
spoke with that officer and declined to call that officer, 
because that officer could not bring forth any additional 
evidence. When we were here for the last hearing, this Court 
made a tentative ruling that you were inclined, kind of, to 
deny, but you wanted more evidence as to what was on the 
video, and you asked defense counsel to find other witnesses 
who actually viewed the video. So that's why we brought 
Officer Hansen here. That's why defense subpoenaed the other 
officer who saw the video or the playback, and I don't mean 
to say video. I really mean to say playback. 
THE COURT: Right. 
MS. WITT: And Mr. Hansen did testify as to what he 
saw on the playback, and that corresponds with his testimony. 





























Defense counsel has brought the defendant's fiance to 
speak today, and she's not been involved in this case 
whatsoever. She didn't - there's nothing in the report where 
she said anything to officers whatsoever about what happened. 
I think the defense - I mean, Officer Hansen was really clear 
about what he saw on that video, and I think based on that 
that there is no reasonable probability. I don't think 
defense has shown that there's a reasonable probability that 
there's any exculpatory evidence that was on any possible 
video. 
The other thing that the court - that the State 
would like to point out is that there was no video made. 
This·is a DVR playback, and unless someone says, Hey, we need 
a copy of this, a copy does not get made. In defense 
counsel's supplemental brief, he actually started parsing 
words saying because we didn't say that there was a video 
that was destroyed in our response to the supplementary 
request for discovery, that we were culpable in that 
destruction just because we didn't say, Oh, well, we also 
found out that it was destroyed. We didn't know at that 
time. We - they asked for a copy of a surveillance video. 
We asked the prison, do you have a copy of the surveillance 
video. They said no. There isn't one. That's the response 
we give to defense counsel. 
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27 t.h • However, this case did not even come to the District 
Attorneys Office until January. 
THE COURT: It was filed January 14. So it was shy 
a few days -
MS. WITT: Correct. 
THE COURT: A month. 
MS. WITT: So Lhere l.s no -
THE COURT: Four months. 
MS. WITT: That's correct. So there is no way the 
State could have gotten this -
THE COURT: So let me interrupt. So I don't need to 
worry about why that is? So - I mean, precisely, you're 
saying I don't even look at good faith, bad faith, 
negligence, anything else, because they haven't shown there's 
a reasonable probability it contains exculpatory evidence? 
MS. WITT: Well, I think your showing first has to 
be that there's a reasonable probability. Then if there's a 
reasonable probability that there's exculpatory evidence, 
then we can look at whether or not the destruction was 
wilful, or was it - there was bad faith, or was there 
anything malicious that was done for the destruction of this. 
This is - was a routine recording over a DVR recording that's 
on a hard drive. It's not ·like we had a physical video, and 
we -
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MS. WITT: - destroyed it, or we lost it. It -
THE COURT: Let me ask you this, though. I mean, 
again I'm not hinting by any of these questions. I don't 
know how I'm going to rule. I really don't, but why wouldn't 
an investigator, knowing that an officer says I just got 
a~saulted - kicked - it's on this thing up in the sky. What 
conceivable reason would that person have for not saying 
let's burn a DVD? 
MS. WITT: Well, if they don't - if they are not 
anticipating filing charges - if they are anticipating on 
dealing with it within the confines of the prison system, I 
don't think that they would do that, and that's the only 
thing I can assume is the reason why there was such a delay 
in filing the charges. I know there was some issue with the 
victim, Con, as far as whether or not they were going to file 
charges against Con, and Con, who was also assaulted by the 
defendant - there was some investigation, some discussion 
with her about whether or not she wanted to file charges or 
have charges filed on her· behalf because of what the 
defendant did. That could have delayed the process, and it 
could have been something that was internal, but there 
certainly isn't something where we take a - we tell the 
prison never, never, never record things. 
THE COURT: Well, -





























THE COURT: - okay. 
MS. WITT: - have their own guidance on when to do 
that. 
THE COURT: Well, and let me - so let me - yeah. I 
mean, what I want to get at in my mind - it may be totally 
irrelevant. I don't know yet. I've got to think it through 
and study the law further, but I mean, you're really 
suggesting - I just have to guess what's happened afterwards, 
right? I mean, because, you know, from a standpoint of just 
common sense it would seem, Okay, I'm an officer. I got 
assaulted by an inmate, I'm going to tell - that's kind of a 
childish way to put it, but - and then you tell the - you 
know, someone - the supervisor, and the supervisor says to 
himself or herself, Well, I know there's a recording of that. 
Let's take a look at it, and then why don't we keep it? And 
then it sits around for three or four months, and a charge is 
filed. And certainly - it certainly - understand - although, 
I've heard no direct testimony. Officer Hansen basically 
said it just goes over and keeps running, but you're really 
sayin~ I should disregard that. I just have to guess, 
beca~se I can't, for the life of me - I mean, how can you say 
that's good faith, or not negligence, or - again I don't know 
what the standard I'm going to have to come up with, but who 
wouldn't know there was a charge filed? I don't understand. 















talked to Officer Hansen that day, and so they would have had 
some sense of I believe him, or I don't, or he's making it 
up, he's a lousy officer, we never believe anything he says, 
or we're - yeah, you know, I - I mean, they're going to -
they're kind of making a decision themselves - what they're 
going to do, and all sorts of things can come and interfere 
with whether they get to the DA's Office and whether it's 
done the next day, or the next week, or the next month. I'm 
sure lots of things can happen, but I just have to guess on 
all that, right? 
11 MS. WITT: No, Your Honor. Actually, he testified 
12 that they viewed the video - they viewed the playback. 













MS. WITT: So there were people who viewed the 
playback. 
THE COURT: Right. 
MS. WITT: So the assumption would be that they 
didn't feel that it was necessary, because it corresponded 
with what happened and what the test - and what the officers, 
who were present, saw that day. And like I said, defense had 
another officer who actually viewed the video who was here 
today who stated they couldn't remembered specifically how 
far Con was away, but she did recall the events as they 
occurred, and that was as was placed in the reports. I think 





























exculpable - reasonable probability that there's exculpable 
material on -
THE COURT: I understand. 
MS. WITT: - this. 
THE COURT: Right. I understand that's what you're 
claiming the hurdle is, but let's assume for a moment that 
they're over it, and I'm just - then you lose. If they get 
past that, you lose, right? I mean, you haven't demonstrated 
good faith, have you? 
MS. WITT: I think we have, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Tell me how. 
MS. WITT: I think as soon as the case was filed, we 
knew -
THE COURT: Well, between then - four months between 
then. The four months between September -
MS. WITT: We, the State, itself had no knowledge 
that this case was ongoing, that anything had occurred until 
it had been presented to our office. 
THE COURT: Certainly. 
MS. WITT: It was not presented to our office until 
January. 
THE COURT: I understand. 
MS. WITT: The moment - within two - I think two 
weeks, defense counsel requested a copy, and we started the 
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THE CdURT: I urtderstand. 
MS. WITT: - if there was a video. 
THE COURT: Yeah, but I'm talking about the - yeah. 
The time - the prison between the time of this event and when 
the DA, your office, got it. Is there any - tell me how you-
MS. WITT: I don't see there's any show of bad 
faith. They routinely let - and I think he testified that if 
- they just routinely copy over. Now, what they're decision 
- if we're trying to find out what their decision was for 
charging this, then we would need to bring in that 
investigator. That's not what this Court requested, and so 
we didn't -
THE COURT: We 11, -
MS. WITT: - subpoena the investigator. The Court 
simply asked defense counsel to find other people to view the 
video so that they could come and testify what they saw on 
the video to make a determination of whether it was 
exculpatory. 
MR. HOWARD: I don't think that's an accurate -
MS. WITT: - and that's -
MR. HOWARD: - statement, Your Honor. 
MS. WITT: I think that is. I mean, -
MR. HOWARD: The Court asked me to - the court 
indicated to me that it needed more information. It didn't 
specifically indicate call persons who have seen the tape. 
38 
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when we got the case, that happened no later than an hour and 
a half after the incident, because we, the State, includes 
the investi9ator. I'm not suggesting that Ms. Witt or the 
DA's Office has -
THE COURT: Well, it's abundantly clear that, yeah, 
that they didn't have anythj.ng to rln with this-
MR. HOWARD: Yeah, but -
THE COURT: Meaning the DA's Office. 
MR. HOWARD: - we, the State, -
MS. WITT: Correct. 
THE COURT: Yeah -
MR. HOWARD: - started with -
THE COURT: There's no question about 
MR. HOWARD: - the investigator. 
THE COURT: - that. None whatsoever. 
MS. WITT: But also, Your Honor, it's an hour and a 
half after this occurred they started investigating it. They 
didn't come to a conclusion. There's nothing to say that, 
Hey, at that moment they decided they were going to file 
charges. 
THE COURT: Right. 
MS. WITT: They didn't - they were continuing an 
investigation. So however long that investigation took, 




THE COURT: Right. 
MS. WITT: I don't have the investigator. I did not 
3 subpoena the investigator to find out why it took so long, 






















from the notes that I took at the ·1ast hearing that the Court 
was looking for additional - an additional evidentiary 
hearing to determine what was on the video. 
THE COURT: Well, I do not remember specifically -
the minute entry says the Court will allow additional time 
for defense to submit further proof of why case was not filed 
until January and show further testimony or affidavit why 
surveillance video was not retained based on the alleged 
assault. So, you know, I sort of thought I'd be hearing from 
all those folks today. That is, the investigator saying 
yeah, you know, I talked to him a week later, a month later. 
I didn't - I had no idea what he'd say, but it turns out 
evidently it was that very day, and I didn't keep that - burn 
a - I didn't know it worked, but now, I guess, I do a little 
bit. So I didn't burn a DVD, and these are the reasons, and 
I didn't go to the DA until this point in time, and these are 
the reasons. 
MS. WITT: And I think, Your Honor, that was the 
confusion, because you put that bu~den on the defense counsel 
.. 
to bring someone in to find out why. This second evidentiary 



























..... , ••·•···-···· .... '' --··--------·-·----.. ------
followup. The State was not requested to find - get the 
investigator here, and I don't even know if Mr. Howard spoke 
to the investigator in this case. I do know he subpoenaed 
and spoke to another officer who viewed the video - the 
playback. 
THE COURT: Well, I think - I certainly don't mean 
to imply that I now am clear who has what burden, but I 
really - I genuinely - I want to get it right. I want to 
follow the law and I -
MS. WITT: Well, in order to -
THE COURT: - I am interested in those other facts. 
MS. WITT: And, Your Honor, in light of the fact 
that the defense filed their supplemental motion the day 
before Thanksgiving and we only received it yesterday, the 
State would ask for time to respond to that, and the State 
will get an affidavit from the investigator to explain the 
procedure or the events as they occurred. 
MR. HOWARD: Your Honor, I fear the state - with all 
respect, because I have considerable admiration for Ms. Witt, 
but the state seems to be missing the point. We don't care 
why it took so long. We don't care why they didn't preserve 
it. They didn't preserve it. The argument that Ms. Witt 
makes is not logical; that the incident happened, officers 
viewed it, and they saw, oh, this video supports our side of 
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logic. 
THE COURT: I'm not saying it's illogical, but I am 
saying 
MR. HOWARD: It would be -
THE COURT: I am somewhat agreeing with Mr. Howard. 
I mean, okay, we've got this woman now. Here it is - I am 
interested in why it wasn't preserved. Whether I should be, 
I don't know. 
You may be right, Ms. Witt. That I may eventually 
conclude they haven't shown any viable basis to believe that 
it had something on there, if I conclude that. I don't know 
yet. I don't know what I'm going to do, but I am interested 
in that issue of why it was not retained. I mean, inter - I 
want to know that, and I think rather than an affidavit - and 
I know everybody's tired of hearing this, but I - you know, I 
can make a decision easy. Yeah, you lose. You - you know, -
I mean, I want to get it right. I want to know the facts as 
best I can. I'd like to hear from that officer who 
eventually - I agree. It's not necessarily important why it 
took three months, but it might be important to know why it 
wasn't done the next day, or the day after, or something. 
When - you know, I don't know what he's going to say, and I 
didn't probably get it clear from Officer Hansen when it's 
recorded over or whether it's 12 days, or 17, or 31. But 



























again from a common sense standpoint, I understand why 
everything isn't kept for~ver. But, you know, if there was a 
- something of interest with possible criminal charges, I am 
- ·I'm at a loss to just see and guess why that investigator 
would say, oh, we don't need that. I mean, that's - I mean, 
yeah, that's like saying, well, the officer saw it, so we can 
- we don't need to have a video cameia in his car, because -
we'll just throw it away, cause he said he stopped him for 
speeding or whatever. Yeah. So I - I mean, I want to 
continue this. I -
MS. WITT: And the State will be happy to subpoena 
the investigator, and the investigator was Officer Debbie 
Kemp. 
THE COURT: And find out why it wasn't retained, and 
maybe some other things. I'll think about it more, but - so 
at the risk of driving the prison nuts and everybody nuts in 
coming back and forth, I think I want to do that. So ... 
All right. Can you all do that? Do you think you 
can get her - she's still there as far as you know? You can 
get her back here in a couple of weeks? 
MS. WITT: She's there. 
THE COURT: Does anyone know if she's still there? 
MS. WITT: Yeah. He believes she's still working 
there, and I believe I've talked to her like a couple of 





























s~bpoen~ing her, we will certainly let Mr. Howard and the 
Court know. 
THE COURT: Two weeks? Does that work for everyone? 
The 16 th ? 
MR. HOWARD: Your Honor, I have that - that 
afternoon's very full for me. 
THE COURT: Me too. The 18 th isn't much better, but: 
it's - the 18 th ? 
MR. HOWARD: The 18th would be better for me. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MS. WITT: I have no objections to the 18 th • 
THE COURT: All right, Thursday, the 18 th at 1:00. 
I'd like to hear - whoever brings them of what transpired 
from the time of the invest - whoever made decisions. 
Whether it was a captain, whether it was the investigators 
divisions - whatever they're called, when they were made 
aware that Officer Hansen alleged an assault against an 
inmate, what was the process? 
MS. WITT: I will have Officer Kemp and any other 
officials that we need to have present at that hearing. 
THE COURT: All right. December 18t\ we' 11 continue 
this for further evidence, and see you then. Thank you all. 
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WEST JORDAN, UTAH - JANUARY 15, 2015 
JUDGE BRUCE LUBECK 
(Transcriber's note: Identification of speakers 
may not be accurate with audio recordings.) 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: State versus Dejesus, 141400093. She's 
Tl-•-----l nuwaLu. This is a continuation of a hear in<J 
we'd had a couple of times. The last time a witness was 
unable to appear. We put it over until today. Where are we 
now? 
MS. WITT: Your Honor, Debbie Kemp is present today 
and is prepared to testify. 
THE COURT: Okay. Let's go ahead and conclude that 
evidence. 
MS. WITT: The State would call Debbie Kemp. 
THE COURT: Step up here in front of my assistant, 
and raise your right hand, and take an oath, please? 
DEBBIE KEMP 
Having first been duly sworn, testified 
upon her oath as follows: 
THE COURT: Have a seat up here. And tell us your 
name and spell your name. 
THE WITNESS: Debbie, D-E-B-B-I-E; Kemp, K-E-M-P. 
THE COURT: It's D-E-B-B-I-E, you said? 



























THE COURT: All right, thank you. 
Ms. Witt? 
MS. WITT: Yes. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MS. WITT: 
Q Could you tell who you're currently employed with? 
A The Department of Corrections. 
Q And were you employed with the Department of 
Corrections in September - on September 27th of 2013? 
A Yes. 
Q And in your employment at that time, what were your 
duties? 
A I am part of the Law Enforcement Bureau, and our 
duties are to investigate any criminal matter; state, federal 
in the prison system and outside. 
Q And was there an incident that occurred on 
September 27 th involving the defendant? Was that Dejesus? 
A Yes. 
Q And were you the - were you assigned as the 
investigator on that case? 
A I was the on-call investigator. 
Q Okay. So you - could you talk a little bit about 
what the policy is as far as playbacks of recordings made in 
the prison through the camera system? 





























Q Okay. So when you were asked to investigate, what 
did you do? 
A I responded to Timp 3 where I was shown where the 
incident occurred, and then I interviewed those involved. 
Officer Hansen, I interviewed later, cause he wasn't in at 
that time. And then at the conclusion of that, I stopped in 
at the officer's station. Well, actually I stopped in the 
officer's station at the beginning and asked if there was a 
recording. And they said, yeah, they had reviewed it, and 
then I went about doing my interviews. And when I stopped on 
my way out, I asked them to get me a copy of that. 
Q So when you say that there was a recording, that's 
just a playback? 
It's a playback -
That's not a -
- uh-huh (affirmative). 
That's not actually physically downloaded? 
No. 
Okay. And so you did make a request -









- for that? Was there anything unusually happening 
- unusual happening within in your department within this 
time frame? 
A There was. Our director passed our bureau with 




























Q And because of that, what - were your duties 
changed or were you -
A Yeah. Many things were put on the back burner. We 
were each assigned 10 applicants to do a background 
investigation on to be completed in three weeks where the 
avcLa~= would be where we're at now at doing four to five and 
having eight weeks. That went on for three or four months 
just to get caught up and, you know, with all the applicants. 
Q And did all this additional work assignments - this 
- did this delay the· actual filing of the case -
A It did -




Okay. Did this also delay your followup 
investigations as far as requesting additional information 
about where or if anything had been downloaded on the video? 
A Yes, it did. 
MS. WITT: I have nothing further, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Howard? 
MR. HOWARD: No questions, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Well, I have some, and then you can 
followup on it. 
So is it Agent Kemp? Ms. Kemp, so when this device 































an image and the machine was then turned off. It would still 
be there? 
THE WITNESS: It - my understanding is is ~t remains 
there for 30 days. 
THE COURT: And what happens after 30 days? 
THE WITNESS: It's gone. As far as I know, that's 
what I've been told . 
THE COURT: Does someone have to do anything to 
make it disappear? 
THE WITNESS: I don't know. I wouldn't think so, 
no. 
THE COURT: So did you ever view an image of this 
alleged event on - allegedly happened September 27 th ? 
THE WITNESS: Yeah. When I initially went in, it 
was to ask if there was video of the incident and to review 
it. The officer that was in there at the time didn't - she 
was new. She didn't have a [inaudible] camera. So I wasn't 
able to, but they mentioned that they had reviewed it. 
unit? 
THE COURT: They meaning someone in that control 
THE WITNESS: I'm sure the officers involved. 
THE COURT: But in that control unit? 
THE WITNESS: Uh-huh (affirmative), yes. 
THE COURT: And so you can view it from in there? 
25 I THE WITNESS: Yes. 
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THE COURT: And if someone's - you said you asked 
someone to make a copy. Where is that done? In there as 
well in that -
name. 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
THE COURT: - control unit? 
THE WITNESS: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
THE COURT: And who did , . , you asK 1:.0 ao 
THE WITNESS: You know, I don't have that officer's 
THE COURT: But in any event, you never got one? 
THE WITNESS: I never got one. 
THE COURT: Did you follow up? 
THE WITNESS: I did, but it - time had passed by the 
time I got back to, you know, being back to my regular 
duties, and that's when I contacted - I probably talked to 
several people over there to get - to find out where the copy 
was, and they said you probably need to get a hold of Captain 
Maryann Redding, which I did. We exchanged several emails, 
and she said after 30 days, it goes off the camera. If there 
was a copy made - if.- she said, then it's been misplaced, 
cause they've looked for it. So she had never seen the copy. 
THE COURT: So by copy, you mean it's burned on -
THE WITNESS: Burned -
·THE COURT: - to a disk? 





























THE COURT: And so this 30 day thing, you don't now 
if that's a decisional process made after 30 days or the 
machine just makes it evaporate, so to speak? You don't 
know? 
THE WITNESS: No, because I don't have the privilege 
of downloading anything like that. So I don't know. All I 
know is what I've been told, ~nrl that it - after 30 days, it 
comes off. 
THE COURT: Who has that privilege of downloading 
it? Just people that work in that control unit? 
THE WITNESS: Typically, it's the captain - a 
lieutenant-captain. 
THE COURT: And so you went back after October 2 T~1-? 
You don't know - do you know when about to try to get that 
copy? 
THE WITNESS: It was probably even past that time, 
'cause we were still doing the background investigations. 
THE COURT: So again you're not sure if it's -
THE WITNESS: But after - yeah. After October 27th, 
that would have been gone. 
THE COURT: Right. And again you're not sure if 
that happens by someone making a decision to engage some 
mechanism to make it disappear or if it just begins at that 
point to record over -
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THE COURT: - so to speak? 
THE WITNESS: That's my -understanding. That there's 
not one person that takes it off, but it records over after 
30 days. 
THE COURT: Give me just a sec. And so - so the 
person you asked to make a recording, you don't know who that 
THE WITNESS: I couldn't - no. I - there's so many 
officers over there. I would not, and I don't work directly 
inside the prison. So I don't have that familiarity with all 
of them. I can say that that's a standard for me to do and 
to ask for it, and I always get it. So ... 
THE COURT: So when you went back to look for it, 
14 who did you go to? 











several officers. Again, you know, I can't give you their 
names, but I can tell you that I was referred to talk to 
Captain Maryann Redding, and it would have been her or maybe 
the lieutenant that would have made that copy. 
THE COURT: Any followup from anyone? 
MS. WITT: No, Your Honor. 
MR. HOWARD: I think I'll ask just a few questions, 
Your Honor. 
CROSS EXAMINATION 





























Q Ms. - is it detective or ... 
A Investigator. 
Q Investigator -
A Uh-huh (affirmative). 
Q - Kemp, I'm going to ask you some questions you 
probably- don't know the answer to; but this camera system 
doesn't record it onto a ~ideotape, does it? 
A I couldn't really even answer that for sure. I 






Rather, it records it - it keeps a digital image? 
I would think so, yeah. 
And that image is stored in the system's computer? 
Uh-huh (affirmative). 
And for whatever reason, the system is set to 
delete after 30 days? 
A Yeah. Delete, record over. It's just - it's gone. 
Q But the system, unless it's run by an old 286 
computer, has plenty of room - it could store it longer? 
Okay, thank you. 
A Yeah, I don't know. 
MR. HOWARD: I didn't expect you'd know all those 
answers there. 



























MS. WITT: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right, thank you. 
THE WITNESS: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
THE COURT: Ms. Kemp, you may step down. 
Well, I think we should take another two weeks and 
get Captain Redding in here. I'm kidding. 
All right. Any other evidence anyone wants to 
present on the matter? 
MS. WITT: No, Your Honor. The State will submit. 
MR. HOWARD: Was the Court being facetious there, or 
are we looking -
THE COURT: Yes -
MR. HOWARD: - for two weeks? 
THE COURT: - I was. 
MR. HOWARD: Oh, okay. 
THE COURT: We've continued it about four times to 
get additional evidence, but no, I'm not facetious in saying 
I'm going to continue it. I want to study this further. I'm 
going to write a written opinion. It's an interesting issue. 
It's a difficult issue. So - and you've submitted your memos 
and such. So I think I'm well advised. I'm going to take it 
under advisement. I'm going to issue a written opinion. So 
I think I will schedule another hearing, but not - and you'll 
have it in writing what I've decided by then, and then we'll 
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I 
let~s see. I guess, the options are I'll dismiss it, or if I 
deny it, then we'll just set a trial, I guess. Right? 
MS. WITT: Correct, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: That's where we are? Yeah, okay. So 
and I'll have that - I'll get it done in the next several 
.days. So let's just go out two weeks, and again I won't -
we'll just either again set say that the 
matter's going to be dismissed then or we'll set a trial. So 
let's have you back, Ms. Dejesus, on the 29 th at 1:30, and I 
will have an opinion done by then. 

















L._ ...... --~·. 
THE COURT: Okay. All right, thank you. See you 
MR. HOWARD: Thank you. 




I HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing transcript in 
the before mentioned proceeding held by Judge Bruce Lubeck 
was transcribed by me from an audio recording and 
is a full, true and correct transcription of the requested 
proc~edings as set forth in the preceding pages to the best 
of my ability. 
Signed July 2, 2015 in Sandy, Utah. 
Carolyn Ert kson 
Certified horthand Reporter 
Certified Court Transcriber 
